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Abstract
We propose a general proof technique to show that a predicate is sound, that is, prevents
stuck computation, with respect to a big-step semantics. This result may look surprising,
since in big-step semantics there is no difference between non-terminating and stuck compu-
tations, hence soundness cannot even be expressed. The key idea is to define constructions
yielding an extended version of a given arbitrary big-step semantics, where the difference is
made explicit. The extended semantics are exploited in the meta-theory, notably they are
necessary to show that the proof technique works. However, they remain transparent when
using the proof technique, since it consists in checking three conditions on the original rules
only, as we illustrate by several examples.
1 Introduction
The semantics of programming languages or software systems specifies, for each program/system
configuration, its final result, if any. In the case of non-existence of a final result, there are two
possibilities:
• either the computation stops with no final result, and there is no means to compute
further: stuck computation,
• or the computation never stops: non-termination.
There are two main styles to define operationally a semantic relation: the small-step style
[35, 36], on top of a reduction relation representing single computation steps, or directly by a set
of rules as in the big-step style [29]. Within a small-step semantics it is straightforward to make
the distinction between stuck and non-terminating computations, while a typical drawback of
the big-step style is that they are not distinguished (no judgement is derived in both cases).
For this reason, even though big-step semantics is generally more abstract, and sometimes
more intuitive to design and therefore to debug and extend, in the literature much more effort
has been devoted to study the meta-theory of small-step semantics, providing properties, and
related proof techniques. Notably, the soundness of a type system (typing prevents stuck com-
putation) can be proved by progress and subject reduction (also called type preservation) [41].
Our quest is then to provide a general proof technique to prove the soundness of a predicate
with respect to an arbitrary big-step semantics. How can we achieve this result, given that in
big-step formulation soundness cannot even be expressed, since non-termination is modelled as
the absence of a final result exactly like stuck computation? The key idea is the following:
1. We define constructions yielding an extended version of a given arbitrary big-step se-
mantics, where the difference between stuckness and non-termination is made explicit.
In a sense, these constructions show that the distinction was “hidden” in the original
semantics.
Soundness conditions for big-step semantics
2. We provide a general proof technique by identifying three sufficient conditions on the
original big-step rules to prove soundness.
Keypoint (2)’s three sufficient conditions are local preservation, ∃-progress, and ∀-progress.
For proving the result that the three conditions actually ensure soundness, the setting up of the
extended semantics from the given one is necessary, since otherwise, as said above, we could
not even express the property.
However, the three conditions deal only with the original rules of the given big-step semantics.
This means that, practically, in order to use the technique there is no need to deal with the
extended semantics. This implies, in particular, that our approach does not increase the original
number of rules. Moreover, the sufficient conditions are checked only on single rules, which
makes explicit the proof fragments typically needed in a proof of soundness. Even though this
is not exploited in this paper, this form of locality means modularity, in the sense that adding
a new rule implies adding the corresponding proof fragment only.
As an important by-product, in order to formally define and prove correct the keypoints (1)
and (2), we propose a formalisation of “what is a big-step semantics” which captures its essential
features. Moreover, we support our approach by presenting several examples, demonstrating
that: on the one hand, their soundness proof can be easily rephrased in terms of our technique,
that is, by directly reasoning on big-step rules; on the other hand, our technique is essential
when the property to be checked (for instance, the soundness of a type system) is not preserved
by intermediate computation steps, whereas it holds for the final result. On a side note,
our examples concern type systems, but the meta-theory we present in this work holds for
any predicate.
We describe now in more detail the constructions of keypoint (1). Starting from an arbitrary
big-step judgment c⇒ r that evaluates configurations c into results r , the first construction
produces an enriched judgement c⇒tr t where t is a trace, that is, the (finite or infinite) sequence
of all the (sub)configurations encountered during the evaluation. In this way, by interpreting
coinductively the rules of the extended semantics, an infinite trace models divergence (whereas
no result corresponds to stuck computation). The second construction is in a sense dual. It is
the algorithmic version of the well-known technique presented in Exercise 3.5.16 from the book
[34] of adding a special result wrong explicitly modelling stuck computations (whereas no result
corresponds to divergence).
By trace semantics and wrong semantics we can express two flavours of soundness, soundness-
may and soundness-must, respectively, and show the correctness of the corresponding proof
technique. This achieves our original aim, and it should be noted that we define soundness with
respect to a big-step semantics within a big-step formulation, without resorting to a small-step
style (indeed, the two extended semantics are themselves big-step).
Lastly, we consider the issue of justifying on a formal basis that the two constructions are
correct with respect to their expected meaning. For instance, for the wrong semantics we would
like to be sure that all the cases are covered. To this end, we define a third construction,
dubbed pev for “partial evaluation”, which makes explicit the computations of a big-step se-
mantics, intended as the sequences of execution steps of the naturally associated evaluation
algorithm. Formally, we obtain a reduction relation on approximated proof trees, so termina-
tion, non-termination and stuckness can be defined as usual. Then, the correctness of traces
and wrong constructions is proved by showing they are equivalent to pev for diverging and
stuck computations, respectively.
In Sect. 2 we illustrate the meta-theory on a running example. In Sect. 3 we define the
trace and wrong constructions. In Sect. 4 we express soundness in the must and may flavours,
introduce the proof technique, and prove its correctness. In Sect. 5 we show in detail how to
2
F. Dagnino et al.
apply the technique to the running example, and other significant examples. In Sect. 6 we
introduce the third construction and prove that the three constructions are equivalent. Finally,
in 7 and 8 we discuss related and further work and summarise our contribution.
2 A meta-theory for big-step semantics
We introduce a formalisation of “what is a big-step semantics” that captures its essential fea-
tures, subsuming a large class of examples (as testified in Sect. 5). This enables a general formal
reasoning on an arbitrary big-step semantics.
A big-step semantics is a triple 〈C , R, R〉 where:
• C is a set of configurations c.
• R ⊆ C is a set of results r . We define judgments j ≡ c⇒ r , meaning that configuration
c evaluates to result r . Set C (j ) = c and R(j ) = r .
• R is a set of rules ρ of shape
j1 . . . jn jn+1
c⇒R(jn+1)
also written in inline format : rule(j1 . . . jn, jn+1, c)
with c ∈ C\R, where j1 . . . jn are the dependencies and jn+1 is the continuation. Set
C (ρ)=c and, for i ∈ 1..n+ 1, C (ρ, i)=C (ji) and R(ρ, i)=R(ji).
• For each result r ∈ R, we implicitly assume a single axiom
r⇒ r
. Hence, the only
derivable judgment for r is r⇒ r , which we will call a trivial judgment.
We will use the inline format, more concise and manageable, for the development of the meta-
theory, e.g., in constructions.
A rule corresponds to the following evaluation process for a non-result configuration: first,
dependencies are evaluated in the given order, then the continuation is evaluated and its result
is returned as result of the entire computation.
Rules as defined above specify an inference system [1, 31], whose inductive interpretation
is, as usual, the semantic relation. However, they carry slightly more structure with respect
to standard inference rules. Notably, premises are a sequence rather than a set, and the last
premise plays a special role. Such additional structure does not affect the semantic relation
defined by the rules, but allows abstract reasoning about an arbitrary big-step semantics, in
particular it is relevant for defining the three constructions. In the following, we will write
R ⊢ c⇒ r when the judgment c⇒ r is derivable in R.
As customary, the (infinite) set of rules R is described by a finite set of meta-rules, each
one with a finite number of premises. As a consequence, the number of premises of rules is not
only finite but bounded. Since we have no notion of meta-rule, we model this feature (relevant
in the following) as an explicit assumption:
BP there exists b ∈ N such that, for each ρ ≡ rule(j1 . . . jn, jn+1, c), n < b.
We end this section illustrating the above definitions and conditions by a simple example: a
λ-calculus with natural constants, successor and non-deterministic choice shown in Fig. 1. We
present this example as an instance of our definition:
• Configurations and results are expressions, and values, respectively.1
1In general, configurations may include additional components, see Sect. 5.2.
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e ::= x | v | e1 e2 | succ e | e1 ⊕ e2 expression
v ::= n | λx.e value
(val)
v⇒ v
( app )
e1⇒ λx.e e2⇒ v2 e[v2/x ]⇒ v
e1 e2⇒ v
(succ)
e⇒ n
succ e⇒ n + 1
(choice)
ei⇒ v
e1 ⊕ e2⇒ v
i = 1, 2
(app) rule(e1⇒ λx .e e2⇒ v2, e[v2/x ]⇒ v , e1 e2)
(succ) rule(e⇒ n, n+ 1⇒ n+ 1, succ e)
(choice) rule(ǫ, ei⇒ v, e1 ⊕ e2) i = 1, 2
Figure 1: Example of big-step semantics
• To have the set of (meta-)rules in our required shape, abbreviated in inline format in the
bottom section of the figure:
– axiom (val) can be omitted (it is implicitly assumed)
– in (app) we consider premises as a sequence rather than a set (the third premise is
the continuation)
– in (succ), which has no continuation, we add a dummy continuation
– on the contrary, in (choice) there is only the continuation (dependencies are the empty
sequence, denoted ǫ in the inline format).
Note that (app) corresponds to the standard left-to-right evaluation order. We could have chosen
the right-to-left order instead:
(app-r) rule(e2⇒ v2 e1⇒ λx.e , e[v2/x]⇒ v, e1 e2)
or even opt for a non-deterministic approach by taking both rules (app) and (app-r). As said
above, these different choices do not affect the semantic relation c⇒ r defined by the inference
system, which is always the same. However, they will affect the way the extended semantics
distinguishing stuck computation and non-termination is constructed. Indeed, if the evaluation
of e1 and e2 is stuck and non-terminating, respectively, we should obtain stuck computation
with rule (app) and non-termination with rule (app-r).
In summary, to see a typical big-step semantics as an instance of our definition, it is enough
to assume an order (or more than one) on premises, make implicit the axiom for results, and
add a dummy continuation when needed. In the examples (Sect. 5), we will assume a left-to-
right order on premises, we will present the rules in both styles. In the technical part (Sect. 3,
Sect. 4 and Sect. 6) we will adopt the inline format.
3 Extended semantics
In the following, we assume a big-step semantics 〈C , R, R〉 and describe two constructions
which make the distinction between non-termination and stuck computation explicit. In both
cases, the approach is based on well-know ideas; the novel contribution is that, thanks to the
meta-theory in Sect. 2, we provide a general construction working on an arbitrary big-step
semantics.
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(app-trace)
e1⇒tr t1 · λx.e e2⇒tr t2 · v2 e[v2/x]⇒tr t · v
e1 e2⇒tr e1 e2 · t1 · λx.e · t2 · v2 · t · v
t1, t2, t∈C
⋆
(div-app-1)
e1⇒tr t
e1 e2⇒tr e1 e2 · t
t∈Cω (div-app-2)
e1⇒tr t1 · λx.e e2⇒tr t
e1 e2⇒tr e1 e2 · t1 · λx.e · t
t1∈C
⋆, t∈Cω
(div-app-3)
e1⇒tr t1 · λx.e e2⇒tr t2 · v2 e[v2/x]⇒tr t
e1 e2⇒tr e1 e2 · t1 · λx.e · t2 · v2 · t
t1, t2 ∈ C
⋆, t ∈ Cω
Figure 2: Trace semantics for application
3.1 Traces
We denote by C ⋆, Cω, and C∞ = C ⋆∪Cω , respectively, the sets of finite, infinite, and possibly
infinite traces, that is, sequences of configurations. We write t · t′ for concatenation of t∈C ⋆
with t′∈C∞.
We derive, from the judgement c⇒ r , an enriched big-step judgement c⇒tr t with t ∈ C∞.
Intuitively, t keeps trace of all the configurations visited during the evaluation, starting from
c itself. To define the trace semantics, we construct, starting from R, a new set of rules Rtr,
which are of two kinds:
trace introduction These rules enrich the standard semantics by finite traces: for each
ρ ≡ rule(j1 . . . jn, jn+1, c) in R, and finite traces t1, . . . , tn+1∈C ⋆, we add the rule
C (j1)⇒tr t1 ·R(j1) . . . C (jn+1)⇒tr tn+1 · R(jn+1)
c⇒tr c · t1 · R(j1) · . . . · tn+1 · R(jn+1)
We denote this rule by trace(ρ, t1, . . . , tn+1), to highlight the relationship with the original
rule ρ. We also add one axiom
r⇒tr r
for each result r .
Such rules derive judgements c⇒ t with t∈C ⋆, for convergent computations.
divergence propagation These rules propagate divergence, that is, if a (sub)configuration in
the premise of a rule diverges, then the subsequent premises are ignored and the config-
uration in the conclusion diverges as well: for each ρ ≡ rule(j1 . . . jn, jn+1, c) in R, index
i∈1..n+ 1, finite traces t1, . . . , ti−1 ∈ C ⋆, and infinite trace t, we add the rule:
C (j1)⇒tr t1 · R(j1) . . . C (ji−1)⇒tr ti−1 ·R(ji−1) C (ji)⇒ t
c⇒ c · t1 ·R(j1) · . . . · ti−1 ·R(ti−1) · t
We denote this rule by prop(ρ, i, t1, . . . , ti−1, t) to highlight the relationship with the
original rule ρ. These rules derive judgements c⇒tr t with t ∈ C
ω , modelling diverging
computations.
The inference system Rtr must be interpreted coinductively, to properly model diverging
computations. Indeed, since there is no axiom introducing an infinite trace, they can be derived
only by an infinite proof tree. We write Rtr ⊢ c⇒tr t when the judgment c⇒tr t is derivable in
Rtr. In the following, given a judgement j = c⇒tr t, we set Tr(j ) = t.
We show in Fig. 2 the rules obtained starting from meta-rule (app) of the example (for other
meta-rules the outcome is analogous).
For instance, set Ω = ω ω = (λx .x x ) (λx .x x ), and tΩ the infinite trace Ω ·ω ·ω ·Ω ·ω ·ω · . . .,
it is easy to see that the judgment Ω⇒tr tΩ can be derived by the following infinite tree:
2
2To help the reader, we add equivalent expressions with a grey background.
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(div-app3)
(trace-val)
ω⇒tr ω
(trace-val)
ω⇒tr ω
(div-app3)
...
ω ω ≡ (x x)[ω/x ]⇒tr tΩ
Ω⇒Ω · ω · ω · tΩ ≡ tΩ
Note that only the judgment Ω⇒tr tΩ can be derived, that is, the trace semantics of Ω is
uniquely determined to be tΩ, since the infinite proof tree forces the equation tΩ = Ω · ωω · tΩ.
This example is a cyclic proof, but there are divergent computations with no circular derivation.
The trace construction satisfies the following property:
Proposition 1. If Rtr ⊢ c⇒tr t holds, then the following are equivalent:
1. Rtr ⊢ c⇒tr t holds by a finite derivation
2. t = t′ · r for some t′ ∈ C ⋆ and r ∈ R
3. t is finite.
Proof. First note that, if c⇒tr t is the conclusion of a rule ρ
tr, then t is infinite iff ρtr is a
divergence propagation rule iff there is a premise j (the last one) of ρtr such that Tr(j ) is
infinite as well. Now we prove the following chain of implications: 1⇒ 2⇒ 3⇒ 1.
To prove 1 ⇒ 2, we proceed by induction on the derivation. If the last applied rule is an
axiom (base case), then c = r ∈ R and t = r . Otherwise, we have applied a rule ρtr with
premises j1, . . . , jn+1, hence, for all i ∈ 1..n + 1, Rtr ⊢ ji holds by a finite derivation, and so,
by induction hypothesis, we have Tr(ji) = ti · ri for some ti ∈ C ⋆ and ri ∈ R. Then, ρtr is
a trace introduction rule, since, if it were a divergence propagation rule, one of its premises
would have an infinite trace, which contradicts the induction hypothesis. Hence, we have
t = c · Tr(j1) · · · · · Tr(jn+1) = t′ · rn+1, as needed.
The implication 2⇒ 3 is trivial. To prove 3⇒ 1, we proceed by induction on (the length of)
t, which is possible since t is finite. The judgement c⇒tr t is derivable by hypothesis, hence it has
a (possibly infinite) derivation. Let us denote by ρtr the last applied rule in this derivation. Since
t is finite, ρtr is not a divergence propagation rule, hence we have only two cases: ρtr is an axiom,
and then the thesis is trivial, or ρtr is a trace introduction rule. In this second case, we have
ρtr ≡ trace(ρ, t1, . . . , tn+1), with premises j1, . . . , jn+1, and t = c · Tr(j1) · · · · · Tr(jn+1); hence,
for all i ∈ 1..n + 1, Tr(ji) is finite and strictly shorter than t, thus, by induction hypothesis,
Rtr ⊢ ji holds by a finite proof tree. Therefore, by applying ρtr to the finite derivations for
j1, . . . , jn+1 we get a finite derivation for c⇒tr t, as needed.
The main consequence of Prop. 1 is that on judgements c⇒tr t where t is finite we can
reason by induction on (trace introduction) rules, even though the set Rtr of rules is interpreted
coinductively. Furthermore, it ensures that if c⇒tr t is derivable with t finite, then t terminates
with a result.
The trace construction is conservative with respect to the original semantics, that is, con-
verging computations are not affected.
Theorem 1. Rtr ⊢ c⇒tr t · r for some t ∈ C ⋆ iff R ⊢ c⇒ r.
Proof. Thanks to Prop. 1, in both directions it is a straightforward induction on rules.
3.2 Wrong
A well-known technique [34] (Exercise 3.5.16) to distinguish between stuck and diverging com-
putations, in a sense “dual” to the previous one, is to add a special result wrong, so that
c⇒ wrong means that the evaluation of c goes stuck.
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(wrong-app)
e1⇒ n
e1 e2⇒ wrong
(wrong-succ)
e⇒ λx.e ′
succ e⇒ wrong
(prop-app-1)
e1⇒ wrong
e1 e2⇒ wrong
(prop-app-2)
e1⇒ λx.e e2⇒ wrong
e1 e2⇒ wrong
(prop-app-3)
e1⇒ λx.e e2⇒ v2 e[v2/x]⇒ wrong
e1 e2⇒ wrong
(prop-succ)
e⇒ wrong
succ e⇒ wrong
Figure 3: Semantics with wrong for application and successor
In this case, to define an “automatic” version of the construction, starting from 〈C , R, R〉, is
a non-trivial problem. Our solution is based on defining a relation on rules, modelling equality up
to a certain index i, also used for other aims in the following. Consider ρ ≡ rule(j1 . . . jn, jn+1, c),
ρ′ ≡ rule(j ′1 . . . j
′
m, j
′
m+1, c
′), and an index i ∈ 1..min(n+ 1,m+ 1), then ρ ∼i ρ′ if
• c = c′
• for all k < i, jk = j ′k
• C (ji) = C (j ′i )
Intuitively, this means that rules ρ and ρ′ model the same computation until the i-th premise.
Using this relation, we derive, from the judgment c⇒ r , an enriched big-step judgement c⇒ rwr
where rwr ∈ R ∪ {wrong}, defined by a set of rules Rwr containing all rules in R and two other
kinds of rules:
wrong introduction These rules derive wrong whenever the (sub)configuration in a premise
of a rule reduces to a result which is not admitted in such (or any equivalent) rule: for
each ρ ≡ rule(j1 . . . jn, jn+1, c) in R, index i ∈ 1..n + 1, and result r ∈ R, if for all rules
ρ′ such that ρ ∼i ρ′, R(ρ′, i) 6= r , then we add the rule wrong(ρ, i, r) as follows:
j1 . . . ji−1 C (ji)⇒ r
c⇒ wrong
We also add an axiom
c⇒ wrong
for each configuration c which is not the conclusion
of any rule.
wrong propagation These rules propagate wrong analogously to those for divergence propa-
gation: for each ρ ≡ rule(j1 . . . jn, jn+1, c) in R, and index i ∈ 1..n + 1, we add the rule
prop(ρ, i,wrong) as follows:
j1 . . . ji−1 C (ji)⇒ wrong
c⇒ wrong
We write Rwr ⊢ c⇒ rwr when the judgment c⇒ rwr is derivable in Rwr.
We show in Fig. 3 the meta-rules for wrong introduction and propagation constructed start-
ing from those for application and successor. For instance, rule (wrong-app) is introduced since
in the original semantics there is rule (app) with e1 e2 in the consequence and e1 in the first
premise, but there is no equivalent rule (that is, with e1 e2 in the consequence and e1 in the
first premise) such that the result in the first premise is n.
The wrong construction is conservative as well.
Theorem 2. Rwr ⊢ c⇒ r iff R ⊢ c⇒ r.
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Proof. The implication R ⊢ c⇒ r ⇒ Rwr ⊢ c⇒ r holds since R ⊆ Rwr by construction. To
prove the vice versa, we proceed by induction on rules. The only relevant cases are rules in R,
because rules in Rwr \R allow only to derive judgements of shape c⇒ wrong. Hence, the thesis
is immediate.
4 Expressing and proving soundness
A predicate (for instance, a typing judgment) is sound when, informally, a program satisfying
the predicate (e.g., a well-typed program) cannot go wrong, following Robin Milner’s slogan
[32]. In small-step style, as firstly formulated in [41], this is naturally expressed as follows:
well-typed programs never reduce to terms which neither are values, nor can be further reduced
(called stuck terms). The standard technique to ensure soundness is by subject reduction
(well-typedness is preserved by reduction) and progress (a well-typed term is not stuck).
We discuss how soundness can be expressed for the two approaches previously presented and
we introduce sufficient conditions. In other words, we provide a proof technique to show the
soundness of a predicate with respect to a big-step semantics. As mentioned in the Introduction,
the extended semantics is only needed to prove the correctness of technique, whereas to apply
the technique for a given big-step semantics it is enough to reason on the original rules.
4.1 Expressing soundness
In the following, we assume a big-step semantics 〈C , R, R〉, and an indexed predicate on con-
figurations, that is, a family Π = (Πι)ι∈I , for I set of indexes, with Πι ⊆ C . A representative
case is that, as in the examples of Sect. 5, the predicate is a typing judgment and the indexes
are types; however, the proof technique could be applied to other kinds of predicates. When
there is no ambiguity, we also denote by Π the corresponding predicate
⋃
ι∈I Πι on C (e.g., to
be well-typed with an arbitrary type).
To discuss how to express soundness of Π, first of all note that, in the non-deterministic case
(that is, there is possibly more than one computation for a configuration), we can distinguish
two flavours of soundness [22]:
soundness-must (or simply soundness) no computation can be stuck
soundness-may at least one computation is not stuck
Soundness-must is the standard soundness in small-step semantics, and can be expressed in the
wrong extension as follows:
soundness-must (wrong) If c ∈ Π, then Rwr 6⊢ c⇒ wrong
Instead, soundness-must cannot be expressed in the trace extension. Indeed, stuck computa-
tions are not explicitly modelled. Conversely, soundness-may can be expressed in the trace
extension as follows:
soundness-may (traces) If c ∈ Π, then there is t such that Rtr ⊢ c⇒tr t
whereas cannot be expressed in the wrong semantics, since diverging computations are not
modelled.
Of course soundness-must and soundness-may coincide in the deterministic case. Finally,
note that indexes (e.g., the specific types of configurations) do not play any role in the above
statements. However, they are relevant in the notion of strong soundness, introduced by [41].
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Strong soundness holds if, for configurations satisfying Πι (e.g., having a given type), compu-
tation cannot be stuck, and moreover, produces a result satisfying Πι (e.g., of the same type)
if terminating. Note that soundness alone does not even guarantee to obtain a result satisfying
Π (e.g., a well-typed result). The three conditions introduced in the following section actually
ensure strong soundness.
In Sect. 4.2 we provide sufficient conditions for soundness-must, showing that they actually
ensure soundness in the wrong semantics (Theorem 3). Then, in Sect. 4.3, we provide (weaker)
sufficient conditions for soundness-may, and show that they actually ensure soundness-may in
the trace semantics (Theorem 4).
4.2 Conditions ensuring soundness-must
The three conditions which ensure the soundness-must property are local preservation, ∃-
progress, and ∀-progress. The names suggest that the former plays the role of the type preser-
vation (subject reduction) property, and the latter two of the progress property in small-step
semantics. However, as we will see, the correspondence is only rough, since the reasoning here
is different.
Considering the first condition more closely, we use the name preservation rather than
type preservation since, as already mentioned, the proof technique can be applied to arbitrary
predicates. More importantly, local means that the condition is on single rules rather than on
the semantic relation as a whole, as standard subject reduction. The same holds for the other
two conditions.
Definition 1 (S1: Local Preservation). For each ρ≡rule(j1 . . . jn, jn+1, c), if c∈Πι, then there
exist ι1, . . . , ιn+1 ∈ I , with ιn+1=ι, such that, for all k ∈ 1..n+ 1:
if, for all h < k, R(jh) ∈ Πιh , then C (jk) ∈ Πιk .
Thinking to the paradigmatic case where the indexes are types, for each rule ρ, if the configu-
ration c in the consequence has type ι, we have to find types ι1, . . . , ιn+1 which can be assigned to
(the configurations in) the premises, in particular the same type as c for the continuation. More
precisely, we start finding type ι1, and successively find the type ιk for (the configuration in)
the k-th premise assuming that the results of all the previous premises have the expected types.
Indeed, if all such previous premises are derivable, then the expected type should be preserved
by their results; if some premise is not derivable, the considered rule is “useless”. For instance,
considering (an instantiation of) meta-rule (app) rule(e1⇒ λx .e e2⇒ v2, e[v2/x ]⇒ v , e1 e2) in
Sect. 2, we prove that e[v2/x ] has the type T of e1 e2 under the assumption that λx .e has type
T ′ → T , and v2 has type T ′ (see the proof example in Sect. 5.1 for more details).
A counter-example to condition S1 is discussed at the beginning of Sect. 5.3.
The following lemma assures that local preservation actually implies preservation of the
semantic relation as a whole.
Lemma 1 (Preservation). Let R and Π satisfy condition S1. If R ⊢ c⇒ r and c ∈ Πι, then
r ∈ Πι.
Proof. The proof is by a double induction. We denote by RH and IH the first and the
second induction hypothesis, respectively. The first induction is on big-step rules. Axioms
have conclusion r⇒ r , hence the thesis holds since r ∈ Πι by hypothesis. Other rules have
shape rule(j1 . . . jn, jn+1, c) with c ∈ Πι. We prove by complete induction on k ∈ 1..n+ 1 that
C (jk) ∈ Πιk , for all k ∈ 1..n+1 and for some ι1, . . . , ιn+1 ∈ I . By S1, there are ι1, . . . , ιn+1 ∈ I
and C (j1) ∈ Πι1 . For k > 1, by IH we know that C (jh) ∈ Πιh , for all h < k. Then, by RH ,
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we get that R(jh) ∈ Πιh . Moreover, by S1, C (jk) ∈ Πιk , as needed. In particular, we have just
proved that C (jn+1) ∈ Πιn+1 and, since by S1 ιn+1 = ι, we get C (jn+1) ∈ Πι. Then, by RH ,
we conclude that r = R(jn+1) ∈ Πι, as needed.
The following proposition is a form of local preservation where indexes (e.g., specific types)
are not relevant, simpler to use in the proofs of Theorems 3 and 4.
Proposition 2. Let R and Π satisfy condition S1. For each rule(j1 . . . jn, jn+1, c) and k∈1..n+ 1,
if c ∈ Π and, for all h < k, R ⊢ jh, then C (jk) ∈ Π.
Proof. The proof is by complete induction on k. Assume the thesis for all h < k, then, since
by hypothesis we have R ⊢ jh for all h < k, we get, by induction hypothesis, C (jh) ∈ Π for all
h < k. By Lemma 1, we also get R(jh) ∈ Π, hence by condition S1, we get the thesis.
The second condition, named ∃-progress, ensures that, for configurations satisfying the pred-
icate Π (e.g., well-typed), we can start constructing a proof tree.
Definition 2 (S2: ∃-progress). For each c ∈ Π\R, C (ρ) = c for some rule ρ.
The third condition, named ∀-progress, ensures that, for configurations satisfying Π, we can
continue constructing the proof tree. This condition uses the notion of rules equivalent up-to
an index introduced at the beginning of Sect. 3.2.
Definition 3 (S3: ∀-progress). For each ρ ≡ rule(j1 . . . jn, jn+1, c), if c ∈ Π, then, for each
k ∈ 1..n+ 1:
if, for all h < k, R ⊢ jh and R ⊢ C (jk)⇒ r, for some r ∈ R, then there is a rule
ρ′ ∼k ρ such that R(ρ
′, k) = r.
We have to check, for each rule ρ, the following: if the configuration c in the consequence
satisfies the predicate (e.g., is well-typed), then, for each k, if the configuration in premise k
evaluates to some result r (that is, R ⊢ C (jk)⇒ r), then there is a rule (ρ itself or another
rule with the same configuration in the consequence and the first k − 1 premises) with such
judgment as k-th premise. This check can be done under the assumption that all the pre-
vious premises are derivable. For instance, consider again (an instantiation of) the meta-rule
(app) rule(e1⇒ λx .e e2⇒ v2, e[v2/x ]⇒ v , e1 e2). Assuming that e1 evaluates to some v1, we have
to check that there is a rule with first premise e1⇒ v1, in pratice, that v1 is a λ-abstraction.
In general, in the common case where for each configuration in the consequence there is only
one applicable meta-rule, checking S3 amounts to show that results obtained in the premises
satisfy the side conditions of such meta-rule, in particular have the required shape (see also the
proof example in Sect. 5.1). If there is more than one applicable meta-rule, (sub)configurations
in the premises should only evaluate to results which satisfy the side conditions of one of them,
for an example see the proof of S3 in Theorem 6.
Soundness-must in wrong semantics Recall that Rwr is the extension of R with wrong
(Sect. 3.2). We prove the claim of soundness-must with respect to Rwr.
Theorem 3. Let R and Π satisfy conditions S1, S2 and S3. If c ∈ Π, then Rwr 6⊢ c⇒ wrong.
Proof. To prove the statement, we assume Rwr ⊢ c⇒ wrong and look for a contradiction. The
proof is by induction on the derivation of c⇒ wrong.
If the last applied rule is an axiom, then, by construction, there is no rule ρ ∈ R such that
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C (ρ) = c, and this violates condition S2, since c ∈ Π.
If the last applied rule is wrong(ρ, i, r), with ρ ≡ rule(j1 . . . jn, jn+1, c), then, by hypothesis,
for all k < i, Rwr ⊢ jk, and Rwr ⊢ C (ji)⇒ r , and these judgments can also be derived in R by
conservativity (Theorem 2). Furthermore, by construction of this rule, we know that there is
no other rule ρ′ ∼i ρ such that R(ρ′, i) = r , and this violates condition S3, since c ∈ Π.
If the last applied rule is prop(ρ, i,wrong), with ρ ≡ rule(j1 . . . jn, jn+1, c), then, by hypothesis,
for all k < i, Rwr ⊢ jk, and these judgments can also be derived in R by conservativity. Then,
by Prop. 2 (which requires condition S1), since c ∈ Π, we have C (ji) ∈ Π, hence we get the
thesis by induction hypothesis.
Sect. 5.1 ends with examples not satisfying properties S2 and S3.
4.3 Conditions ensuring soundness-may
As discussed in Sect. 4.1, in the trace semantics we can only express a weaker form of soundness:
at least one computation is not stuck (soundness-may). As the reader can expect, to ensure this
property weaker sufficient conditions are enough: namely, condition S1, and another condition
named progress-may and defined below.
We write R 6⊢ c⇒ if c does not converge (there is no r such that R ⊢ c⇒ r).
Definition 4 (S4: progress-may). For each c ∈ Π\R, there is ρ ≡ rule(j1 . . . jn, jn+1, c) such
that:
if there is a (first) k ∈ 1..n + 1 such that R 6⊢ jk and, for all h < k, R ⊢ jh, then
R 6⊢ C (jk)⇒ .
This condition can be informally understood as follows: we have to show that there is an
either finite or infinite computation for c. If we find a rule where all premises are derivable (no
k), then there is a finite computation. Otherwise, c does not converge. In this case, we should
find a rule where the configuration in the first non-derivable premise k does not converge as
well. Indeed, by coinductive reasoning (use of Lemma 2 below), we obtain that c diverges. The
following proposition shows that this condition is indeed a weakening of S2 and S3.
Proposition 3. Conditions S2 and S3 imply condition S4.
Proof. For each c ∈ C , let us define bc ∈ N as max{#ρ | C (ρ) = c}, which is finite by the
boundedness condition, see condition BP at page 3. For each rule ρ, with C (ρ) = c, let us
denote by nd(ρ) the index of the first premise of ρ which is not derivable, if any, otherwise set
nd(ρ) = bc. For each c ∈ Π, we first prove the following fact:
(⋆) for each rule ρ, with C (ρ) = c, there exists a rule ρ′ such that
C (ρ′) = c, nd(ρ′) ≥ nd(ρ) and, if nd(ρ′) ≤ bc, then, for all r ∈ R, R 6⊢ C (ρ′, nd(ρ′))⇒ r .
Note that the requirement in (⋆) is the same as that of condition S4. The proof is by complete
induction on h(ρ) = bc+1−nd(ρ). If h(ρ) = 0, hence nd(ρ) = bc+1, then the thesis follows by
taking ρ′ = ρ. Otherwise, we have two cases: if there is no r ∈ R such thatR ⊢ C (ρ, nd(ρ))⇒ r ,
then we have the thesis taking ρ′ = ρ; otherwise, by condition S3, there is a rule ρ′′ ∼nd(ρ) ρ
such that R(ρ′′, nd(ρ)) = r , hence nd(ρ′′) > nd(ρ). Then, we have h(ρ′′) < h(ρ), hence we get
the thesis by induction hypothesis.
Now, by condition S2, there is a rule ρ with C (ρ) = c, and applying (⋆) to ρ we get condition S4.
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Soundness-may in trace semantics Recall that Rtr is the extension of R with traces,
defined in Sect. 3.1, where judgements have shape c⇒tr t, with t ∈ C∞.
The following lemma provides a proof principle useful to coinductively show that a property
ensures the existence of an infinite trace, in particular to show Theorem 4. It is a slight variation
of an analogous principle presented in [8].
Lemma 2. Let S ⊆ C be a set. If, for all c ∈ S, there are ρ ≡ rule(j1 . . . jn, jn+1, c) and
k ∈ 1..n+ 1 such that
1. for all h < k, R ⊢ jh, and
2. C (jk) ∈ S
then, for all c ∈ S, there is t ∈ Cω such that Rtr ⊢ c⇒tr t.
Proof. First of all, for each c ∈ S, we construct a trace tc ∈ C∞, which will be the candidate
trace to prove the thesis. By hypothesis, there is a rule ρc ≡ rule(j c1 . . . j
c
nc
, j cnc+1, c) and an
index ic ∈ 1..nc + 1 such that, for all k < ic, we have R ⊢ j
c
k . Therefore, by Theorem 2, there
are finite traces tc1, . . . , t
c
ic
∈ C ⋆ such that, for all k < ic , we have Rtr ⊢ C (j ck )⇒tr t
c
k ·R(j
c
k ),
and, in addition, we know that C (j cic ) ∈ S. Then, for each c ∈ S, we can introduce a variable
Xc and define an equation Xc = c · tc1 · · · · · t
c
ic−1
· XC (j cic ). The set of all such equations is a
guarded system of equations, which thus has a unique solution function s : S → Cω , that is,
for each c ∈ S we have s(c) = c · tc1 · · · · · t
c
ic−1
· s(C (j cic )).
We now have to prove that, for all c ∈ S, we have Rtr ⊢ c⇒tr s(c). To this end, consider
the set S ′ = {〈c, s(c)〉 | c ∈ S}∪ {〈c, t · r〉 | Rtr ⊢ c⇒tr t · r}, then the proof is by coinduction.
Let 〈c, t〉 ∈ S ′, then we have to find a rule
j1 . . . jn
c⇒tr t
∈ Rtr such that, for all k ∈ 1..n,
〈C (jk), Tr(jk)〉 ∈ S ′. We have two cases:
• if t = s(c), then the needed rule is prop(ρc , ic , tc1, . . . , t
c
ic−1, s(C (j
c
ic
))), and
• if t = t′ ·r is finite and Rtr ⊢ c⇒tr t, then c⇒tr t is the consequence of a trace introduction
rule, where all premises are derivable.
We end this section with the proof of soundness-may for the trace semantics.
Theorem 4. Let R and Π satisfy conditions S1 and S4. If c ∈ Π, then there is t such that
Rtr ⊢ c⇒tr t.
Proof. First note that, thanks to Theorem 1, the statement is equivalent to the following:
If c ∈ Π and R 6⊢ c⇒ , then there is t ∈ Cω such that Rtr ⊢ c⇒tr t.
Then, the proof follows from Lemma 2. We define S = {c | c∈Π and R 6⊢ c⇒}, and show
that, for all c ∈ S, there are ρ ≡ rule(j1 . . . jn, jn+1, c) and k ∈ 1..n+1 such that, for all h < k,
R ⊢ jh, and C (jk) ∈ S.
Consider c ∈ S, then, by S4, there is ρ ≡ rule(j1 . . . jn, jn+1, c). By definition of S, we have
R 6⊢ c⇒ , hence there exists a (first) k ∈ 1..n+ 1 such that R 6⊢ jk, since, otherwise, we would
have R ⊢ c⇒R(jn+1). Then, since k is the first index with such property, for all h < k, we
have R ⊢ jh, hence, again by condition S4, we have that R 6⊢ C (jk)⇒ . Finally, since for all
h < k we have R ⊢ jh, by Prop. 2 we get C (jk) ∈ Π, hence C (jk) ∈ S, as needed.
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5 Examples
Sect. 5.1 explains in detail how a typical soundness proof can be rephrased in terms of our
technique, by reasoning directly on big-step rules. Sect. 5.2 shows a case where this is advan-
tageous, since the property to be checked is not preserved by intermediate computation steps,
whereas it holds for the final result. Sect. 5.3 considers a more sophisticated type system, with
intersection and union types. Sect. 5.4 shows another example where subject reduction is not
preserved, whereas soundness can be proved with our technique. This example is intended as
a preliminary step towards a more challenging case. Finally, Sect. 5.5 shows how our approach
can also easily deal with memory.
For reader’s convenience, we provide the reduction rules also in inline format, where the
dummy continuation r⇒ r , if any, is made explicit.
5.1 Simply-typed λ-calculus with recursive types
As a first example, we take the λ-calculus with natural constants, successor, and choice used
in Sect. 2 (Fig. 1). We consider a standard simply-typed version with recursive types, obtained
by interpreting the production in Fig. 4 coinductively. Introducing recursive types makes the
calculus non-normalising and permits to write interesting programs such as Ω (see Sect. 3.1).
The typing rules are recalled in Fig. 4. Type environments, written Γ, are finite maps from
variables to types, and Γ{T/x} denotes the map which returns T on x and coincides with Γ
elsewhere. We write ⊢ e : T for ∅ ⊢ e : T .
T ::= Nat | T1 → T2 type
(t-var)
Γ ⊢ x : T
Γ(x) = T (t-const)
Γ ⊢ n : Nat
(t-abs)
Γ{T ′/x} ⊢ e : T
Γ ⊢ λx .e : T ′ → T
(t-app)
Γ ⊢ e1 : T
′ → T Γ ⊢ e2 : T
′
Γ ⊢ e1 e2 : T
(t-succ)
Γ ⊢ e : Nat
Γ ⊢ succ e : Nat
(t-choice)
Γ ⊢ e1 : T Γ ⊢ e2 : T
Γ ⊢ e1 ⊕ e2 : T
Figure 4: λ-calculus: type system
Let R1 be the big-step semantics defined in Fig. 1, and let Π1T (e) hold if ⊢ e : T , for T
defined in Fig. 4. To prove the three conditions S1, S2 and S3 of Sect. 4.2, we need lemmas of
inversion, substitution and canonical forms, as in the standard technique.
Lemma 3 (Inversion). 1. If Γ ⊢ x : T, then Γ(x ) = T.
2. If Γ ⊢ n : T, then T = Nat.
3. If Γ ⊢ λx .e : T, then T = T1 → T2 and Γ{T1/x} ⊢ e : T2.
4. If Γ ⊢ e1 e2 : T, then Γ ⊢ e1 : T ′ → T, and Γ ⊢ e2 : T ′.
5. If Γ ⊢ succ e : T, then T = Nat and Γ ⊢ e : Nat.
6. If Γ ⊢ e1 ⊕ e2 : T, then Γ ⊢ ei : T with i ∈ 1, 2.
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Lemma 4 (Substitution). If Γ{T ′/x} ⊢ e : T and Γ ⊢ e ′ : T ′, then Γ ⊢ e[e ′/x ] : T.
Lemma 5 (Canonical Forms).
1. If ⊢ v : T ′ → T, then v = λx .e.
2. If ⊢ v : Nat, then v = n.
Theorem 5 (Soundness). The big-step semantics R1 and the indexed predicate Π1 satisfy the
conditions S1, S2 and S3 of Sect. 4.2.
Since the aim of this first example is to illustrate the proof technique, we provide a proof
where we explain the reasoning in detail.
Proof of S1. We should prove this condition for each (instantiation of meta-)rule.
(app): Assume that ⊢ e1 e2 : T holds. We have to find types for the premises, notably T for the
last one. We proceed as follows:
1. First premise: by Lemma 3 (4), ⊢ e1 : T ′ → T .
2. Second premise: again by Lemma 3 (4), ⊢ e2 : T ′ (without needing the assumption
⊢ λx .e : T ′ → T ).
3. Third premise: ⊢ e[v2/x ] : T should hold (assuming ⊢ λx .e : T ′ → T , ⊢ v2 : T ′). Since
⊢ λx .e : T ′ → T , by Lemma 3 (3) we have x :T ′ ⊢ e : T , so by Lemma 4 and ⊢ v2 : T
′
we have ⊢ e[v2/x ] : T .
(succ): This rule has an implicit continuation n+ 1⇒ n+ 1. Assume that ⊢ succ e : T holds.
By Lemma 3 (5), T = Nat, and ⊢ e : Nat, hence we find Nat as type for the first premise.
Moreover, ⊢ n+ 1 : Nat holds by rule (t-const).
(choice): Assume that ⊢ e1 ⊕ e2 : T holds. By Lemma 3 (6), we have ⊢ ei : T , with i ∈ 1, 2.
Hence we find T as type for the premise.
Proof of S2. We should prove that, for each non-result configuration (here, expression e which
is not a value) such that ⊢ e : T holds for some T , there is a rule with this configuration
in the consequence. The expression e cannot be a variable, since a variable cannot be typed
in the empty environment. Application, successor and choice appear as consequence in the
reduction rules.
Proof of S3. We should prove this condition for each (instantiation of meta-)rule.
(app): Assuming ⊢ e1 e2 : T , again by Lemma 3 (4) we get Γ ⊢ e1 : T ′ → T .
1. First premise: if e1⇒ v is derivable, then there should be a rule with e1 e2 in the con-
sequence and e1⇒ v as first premise. Since we proved S1, by preservation (Lemma 1)
⊢ v : T ′ → T holds. Then, by Lemma 5 (1), v has shape λx .e, hence the required rule
exists. As noted at page 10, in practice checking S3 for a (meta-)rule amounts to show
that (sub)configurations in the premises only evaluate to results which satisfy the side
conditions, in this case to have the required shape (to be a λ-abstraction).
2. Second premise: if e1⇒ λx .e, and e2⇒ v2, then there should be a rule with e1 e2 in
the consequence and e1⇒ λx .e, e2⇒ v as first two premises. This is trivial since the
meta-variable v2 can be freely instantiated in the meta-rule.
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(succ): Assuming ⊢ succ e : T , again by Lemma 3 (5) we get ⊢ e : Nat. If e⇒ v is derivable,
there should be a rule with succ e in the consequence and e⇒ v as first premise. Indeed, by
preservation (Lemma 1) and Lemma 5 (2), v has shape n. For the second premise, if n+ 1⇒ v
is derivable, then v is necessarily n+ 1.
(choice): Trivial since the meta-variable v can be freely instantiated.
An interesting remark is that, differently from the standard approach, there is no induction
in the proof: everything is by cases. This is a consequence of the fact that, as discussed in
Sect. 4.2, the three conditions are local, that is, they are conditions on single rules. Induction
is “hidden” in the proof that those three conditions are sufficient to ensure soundness.
If we drop in Fig. 1 rule (succ), then condition S2 fails, since there is no longer a rule for the
well-typed non-result configuration succn. If we add the (fool) rule ⊢ 0 0 : Nat, then condition
S3 fails for rule (app), since 0⇒ 0 is derivable, but there is no rule with 0 0 in the conclusion
and 0⇒ 0 as first premise.
5.2 MiniFJ&λ
In this example, the language is a subset of FJ&λ [12], a calculus extending Featherweight Java
(FJ) with λ-abstractions and intersection types, introduced in Java 8. To keep the example
small, we do not consider intersections and focus on one key typing feature: λ-abstractions can
only be typed when occurring in a context requiring a given type (called the target type). In
a small-step semantics, this poses a problem: reduction can move λ-abstractions into arbitrary
contexts, leading to intermediate terms which would be ill-typed. To maintain subject reduc-
tion, in [12] λ-abstractions are decorated with their initial target type. In a big-step semantics,
there is no need of intermediate terms and annotations.
The syntax is given in the first part of Fig. 5. We assume sets of variables x , class names
C, interface names I, J, field names f, and method names m. Interfaces which have exactly
one method (dubbed functional interfaces) can be used as target types. Expressions are those
of FJ, plus λ-abstractions, and types are class and interface names. In λxs.e we assume that
xs is not empty and e is not a λ-abstraction. For simplicity, we only consider upcasts, which
have no runtime effect, but are important to allow the programmer to use λ-abstractions, as
exemplified in discussing typing rules.
To be concise, the class table is abstractly modelled as follows:
• fields(C) gives the sequence of field declarations T1 f1;..Tn fn; for class C
• mtype(T ,m) gives, for each method m in class or interface T , the pair T1 . . .Tn → T
′
consisting of the parameter types and return type
• mbody(C,m) gives, for each method m in class C, the pair 〈x1 . . . xn, e〉 consisting of the
parameters and body
• <: is the reflexive and transitive closure of the union of the extends and implements rela-
tions
• !mtype(I) gives, for each functional interface I, mtype(I,m), where m is the only method
of I.
The big-step semantics is given in the last part of Fig. 5. MiniFJ&λ shows an example of
instantiation of the framework where configurations include an auxiliary structure, rather than
being just language terms. In this case, the structure is an environment e (a finite map from
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variables to values) modelling the current stack frame. Results are values, which are either
objects, of shape [vs ]C, or λ-abstractions.
e ::= x | e.f | new C(e1, . . . , en) | e.m(e1, . . . , en) | λxs.e | (T)e expression
xs ::= x1 . . . xn variable list
T ::= C | I type
c ::= 〈e, e〉 | v configuration
v ::= [vs ]C | λxs .e result (value)
vs ::= v1, . . . , vn value list
(var)
〈e, x〉⇒ v
e(x) = v
(field-access)
〈e, e〉⇒ [v1, . . . , vn]
C
〈e, e.fi〉⇒ vi
fields(C) = T1 f1; . . .Tn fn;
i ∈ 1..n
(new)
〈e, ei〉⇒ vi ∀i ∈ 1..n
〈e, new C(e1, . . . , en)〉⇒ [v1, . . . , vn]C
(invk)
〈e, e0〉⇒ [vs ]
C
〈e, ei〉⇒ vi ∀i ∈ 1..n〈
x1:v1, . . . , xn:vn, this:[vs ]
C, e
〉
⇒ v
〈e, e0.m(e1, . . . , en)〉⇒ v
mbody(C,m) = 〈x1 . . . xn, e〉
(λ-invk)
〈e, e0〉⇒ λxs .e
〈e, ei〉⇒ vi ∀i ∈ 1..n
〈x1:v1, . . . , xn:vn, e〉⇒ v
〈e, e0.m(e1, . . . , en)〉⇒ v
(upcast)
〈e, e〉⇒ v
〈e, (T)e〉⇒ v
(var) rule(ǫ, v⇒ v , 〈e, x〉) e(x) = v
(field-access) rule(〈e, e〉⇒ [v1, . . . , vn]
C, vi⇒ vi, 〈e, e.fi〉) fields(C) = T1 f1; . . .Tn fn; i ∈ 1..n
(new) rule(〈e, es〉⇒ vs, [v1, . . . , vn]
C⇒ [v1, . . . , vn]
C, new C(e1, . . . , en))
(invk) rule(〈e, e0〉⇒ [vs
′]C, 〈e, es〉⇒ vs , 〈e′, e〉⇒ v , 〈e, e0.m(e1, . . . , en)〉)
e′ = x1:v1, . . . , xn:vn, this:[vs ]
C mbody(C,m) = 〈x1 . . . xn, e〉
(λ-invk) rule(〈e, e0〉⇒ λxs .e, 〈e, es〉⇒ vs , 〈e
′, e〉⇒ v , 〈e, e0.m(e1, . . . , en)〉)
e′ = x1:v1, . . . , xn:vn
(upcast) rule(ǫ, 〈e, e〉⇒ v , (T)e)
where 〈e, es〉⇒ vs is short for 〈e, e1〉⇒ v1, . . . , 〈e, en〉⇒ vn
Figure 5: MiniFJ&λ: syntax and big-step semantics
Rules for FJ constructs are straightforward. Note that, since we only consider upcasts,
casts have no runtime effect. Indeed, they are guaranteed to succeed on well-typed expressions.
Rule (λ-invk) shows that, when the receiver of a method is a λ-abstraction, the method name is
not significant at runtime, and the effect is that the body of the function is evaluated as in the
usual application.
The type system is given in Fig. 6. Method bodies are expected to be well-typed with
respect to method types. Formally, mbody(C,m) and mtype(C,m) are either both defined or
both undefined: in the first case mbody(C,m) = 〈x1 . . . xn, e〉, mtype(C,m) = T1 . . .Tn → T ,
and x1:T1, . . . , xn:Tn, this:C ⊢ e : T . Moreover, we assume other standard FJ constraints on
the class table, such as no field hiding, no method overloading, the same parameter and return
types in overriding.
16
F. Dagnino et al.
(t-conf)
⊢ vi : Ti ∀i ∈ 1..n x1:T
′
1, . . . , xn:T
′
n ⊢ e : T
⊢ 〈x1:v1, . . . , xn:vn, e〉 : T
Ti <: T
′
i ∀i ∈ 1..n
(t-var)
Γ ⊢ x : T
Γ(x) = T (t-field-access)
Γ ⊢ e : C
Γ ⊢ e.f : Ti
fields(C) = T1 f1; . . .Tn fn;
i ∈ 1..n
(t-new)
Γ ⊢ ei : Ti ∀i ∈ 1..n
Γ ⊢ new C(e1, . . . , en) : C
fields(C) = T1 f1; . . .Tn fn;
(t-invk)
Γ ⊢ ei : Ti ∀i ∈ 0..n
Γ ⊢ e0.m(e1, . . . , en) : T
e0 not of shape λxs .e
mtype(T0,m) = T1 . . .Tn → T
(t-λ)
x1:T1, . . . , xn:Tn ⊢ e : T
Γ ⊢ λxs.e : I
!mtype(I) = T1 . . .Tn → T
(t-upcast)
Γ ⊢ e : T
Γ ⊢ (T)e : T
(t-object)
Γ ⊢ vi : T
′
i ∀i ∈ 1..n
Γ ⊢ [v1, . . . , vn]C : C
fields(C) = T1 f1; . . .Tn fn;
T ′i <: Ti ∀i ∈ 1..n
(t-sub)
Γ ⊢ e : T
Γ ⊢ e : T ′
e not of shape λxs .e
T <: T ′
Figure 6: MiniFJ&λ: type system
Besides the standard typing features of FJ, the MiniFJ&λ type system ensures the follow-
ing.
• A functional interface I can be assigned as type to a λ-abstraction which has the functional
type of the method, see rule (t-λ).
• A λ-abstraction should have a target type determined by the context where the λ-abstraction
occurs. More precisely, see [26] page 602, a λ-abstraction in our calculus can only occur as
return expression of a method or argument of constructor, method call or cast. Then, in
some contexts a λ-abstraction cannot be typed, in our calculus when occurring as receiver
in field access or method invocation, hence these cases should be prevented. This is im-
plicit in rule (t-field-access), since the type of the receiver should be a class name, whereas
it is explicitly forbidden in rule (t-invk). For the same reason, a λ-abstraction cannot be
the main expression to be evaluated.
• A λ-abstraction with a given target type J should have type exactly J: a subtype I of J is
not enough. Consider, for instance, the following program:
interface J {}
interface I extends J { A m(A x); }
class C {
C m(I y) { return new C().n(y); }
C n(J y) { return new C(); }
}
and the main expression new C().n(λx .x). Here, the λ-abstraction has target type J,
which is not a functional interface, hence the expression is ill-typed in Java (the compiler
has no functional type against which to typecheck the λ-abstraction). On the other hand,
in the body of method m, the parameter y of type I can be passed, as usual, to method
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n expecting a supertype. For instance, the main expression new C().m(λx .x) is well-
typed, since the λ-abstraction has target type I, and can be safely passed to method n,
since it is not used as function there. To formalise this behaviour, it is forbidden to apply
subsumption to λ-abstractions, see rule (t-sub).
• However, λ-abstractions occurring as results rather than in source code (that is, in the
environment and as fields of objects) are allowed to have a subtype of the required type,
see the explicit side condition in rules (t-conf) and (t-object). For instance, if C is a class
with one field J f, the expression new C((I)λx.x) is well-typed, whereas new C(λx.x) is
ill typed, since rule (t-sub) cannot be applied to λ-abstractions. When the expression is
evaluated, the result is [λx.x]C, which is well-typed.
As mentioned at the beginning, the obvious small-step semantics would produce not typable
expressions. In the above example, we get
new C((I)λx.x) −→ new C(λx.x) −→ [λx.x]C
and new C(λx.x) has no type, while new C((I)λx.x) and [λx.x]C have type C.
As expected to show soundness (Theorem 6) lemmas of inversion and canonical forms are
handy: they can be easily proved as usual. Instead we do not need a substitution lemma, since
environments associate variables to values. We write Γ ⊢ e :<: T as short for Γ ⊢ e : T ′ and
T ′ <: T for some T ′.
Lemma 6 (Inversion). 1. If ⊢ 〈x1:v1, . . . , xn:vn, e〉 : T, then ⊢ vi :<: Ti for all i ∈ 1..n and
x1:T1, . . . , xn:Tn ⊢ e : T.
2. If Γ ⊢ x : T, then Γ(x ) <: T.
3. If Γ ⊢ e.fi : T, then Γ ⊢ e : C and fields(C) = T1 f1; . . .Tn fn; and Ti <: T where i ∈ 1..n.
4. If Γ ⊢ new C(e1, . . . , en) : T, then C <: T and fields(C) = T1 f1; . . .Tn fn; and Γ ⊢ ei : Ti
for all i ∈ 1..n.
5. If Γ ⊢ e0.m(e1, . . . , en) : T, then e0 not of shape λxs .e and Γ ⊢ ei : Ti for all i ∈ 0..n
and mtype(T0,m) = T1 . . .Tn → T ′ with T ′ <: T.
6. If Γ ⊢ λxs .e : T, then T = I and !mtype(I) = T1 . . .Tn → T
′ and x1:T1, . . . , xn:Tn ⊢ e : T
′.
7. If Γ ⊢ (T ′)e : T, then Γ ⊢ e : T ′ and T ′ <: T.
8. If Γ ⊢ [v1, . . . , vn]C : T, then C <: T and fields(C) = T1 f1; . . .Tn fn; and Γ ⊢ vi :<: Ti
for all i ∈ 1..n.
Lemma 7 (Canonical Forms).
1. If ⊢ v : C, then v = [vs ]D and D <: C.
2. If ⊢ v : I, then either v = [vs ]C and C <: I or v = λxs.e and I is a functional interface.
In order to prove soundness, set R2 the big-step semantics defined in Fig. 5, and let
Π2T (〈e, e〉) hold if ⊢ 〈e, e〉 :<: T , Π2T (v) if ⊢ v :<: T , for T defined in Fig. 5.
To read this and the following soundness proofs of examples, it is convenient to refer to the
reduction rules in inline format, where the dummy continuation r⇒ r , if any, is made explicit.
Theorem 6 (Soundness). The big-step semantics R2 and the indexed predicate Π2 satisfy the
conditions S1, S2 and S3 of Sect. 4.2.
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Proof. Condition S1. The proof is by cases on instantiations of meta-rules. In considering
a rule with typed consequence 〈y1:vˆ1, . . . , yp:vˆp, e〉 Lemma 6 (1) implies ⊢ vˆℓ :<: Tˆℓ for all
ℓ ∈ 1 . . . p and y1:Tˆ1, . . . , yp:Tˆp ⊢ e : T for some Tˆ1, . . . , Tˆp.
Rule (var). Lemma 6 (1) gives ⊢ e(x ) :<: T ′ and x :T ′ ⊢ x : T . Lemma 6 (2) implies T ′ <: T ,
so we conclude ⊢ e(x ) :<: T by transitivity of <:.
Rule (field-access). Lemma 6 (3) applied to Γ ⊢ e.fi : T implies Γ ⊢ e : D and fields(D) =
T1 f1; . . .Tm fm; and Ti <: T where i ∈ 1..m. Since 〈e, e〉⇒ [v1, . . . , vn]C is a premise we
assume ⊢ [v1, . . . , vn]C :<: D, which implies C <: D and fields(C) = T ′1 f
′
1; . . .T
′
n f
′
n; and Γ ⊢
vj :<: T
′
j for all j ∈ 1..n by Lemma 6 (8). From C <: D we have m ≤ n and Tj = T
′
j and
fj = f
′
j for all j ∈ 1..m. We conclude ⊢ vi :<: T .
Rule (new). Lemma 6 (4) applied to Γ ⊢ new C(e1, . . . , en) : T implies C <: T and fields(C) =
T1 f1; . . .Tn fn; and Γ ⊢ ei : Ti for all i ∈ 1..n. Since 〈e, ei〉⇒ vi is a premise we assume
⊢ vi :<: Ti for all i ∈ 1..n. Using rule (t-object) we derive ⊢ [v1, . . . , vn]C :<: T .
Rule (invk). Lemma 6 (5) applied to Γ ⊢ e0.m(e1, . . . , en) : T implies e0 not of shape λxs .e
and Γ ⊢ ei : Ti for all i ∈ 0..n and mtype(T0,m) = T1 . . .Tn → T ′ with T ′ <: T . Since
〈e, e0〉⇒ [vs ′]C is a premise we assume ⊢ [vs ′]C :<: T0, which implies C <: T0 by Lemma 6 (8).
Since 〈e, ei〉⇒ vi is a premise we assume ⊢ vi :<: Ti for all i ∈ 1..n. We have mtype(C,m) =
T1 . . .Tn → T
′ since mtype(T0,m) = T1 . . .Tn → T
′ and C <: T0. The typing conditions on
the class table imply Γ0 ⊢ e :<: T ′ where Γ0 = {x1:T1, . . . , xn:Tn, this:C}. Therefore using
rule (t-conf) we derive ⊢
〈
x1:v1, . . . , xn:vn, this:[vs
′]C, e
〉
:<: T .
Rule (lambda-invk). Lemma 6 (5) applied to Γ ⊢ e0.m(e1, . . . , en) : T implies e0 not of shape
λxs .e ′ and Γ ⊢ ei : Ti for all i ∈ 0..n and mtype(T0,m) = T1 . . .Tn → T ′ with T ′ <: T .
Since 〈e, e0〉⇒ λxs .e is a premise we assume ⊢ λxs .e :<: T0, which implies I <: T0 and
!mtype(I) = T1 . . .Tn → T ′ and x1:T1, . . . , xn:Tn ⊢ e : T ′ by Lemma 6 (6). Since 〈e, ei〉⇒ vi
is a premise we assume ⊢ vi :<: Ti for all i ∈ 1..n. Therefore using rule (t-conf) we derive
⊢ 〈x1:v1, . . . , xn:vn, e〉 :<: T .
Rule (upcast). Lemma 6 (7) applied to Γ ⊢ (T ′)e : T implies Γ ⊢ e :<: T . From 〈e, e〉⇒ v we
conclude ⊢ v :<: T .
Condition S2. It is easy to verify that if e is generated by the grammar of Fig. 5, then there
is a rule in Fig. 5 whose conclusion is 〈e, e〉. In particular, for a configuration of shape 〈e, x〉,
rule (var) can be applied, since ⊢ 〈e, x〉 : T implies that x is in the domain of e by Lemmas
6 (1) and (2).
Condition S3. Rule (var) requires that v reduces to v , and this is the only derivable judgment
for v . Rule (field-access) requires that 〈e, e〉 reduces to v = [v1, . . . , vm]D such that fields(D) =
T1 f1; . . .Tm fm;, and i ∈ 1..m. Typing rule (t-field-access) prescribes for the expression e a
class type C such that fields(C) = T1 f1; . . .Tn fn;, and i ∈ 1..n. The validity of condition S1
(which assures type preservation by Lemma 1), and Lemma 7 (1), imply that v is an object of a
subclass D of C, and the well-formedness of the class table implies that n ≤ m, hence i ∈ 1..m.
For a method call e0.m(e1, . . . , en), the configuration 〈e, e0〉 can reduce either to an object
[vs ]C or to a lambda-expression. In the first case we can apply rule (invk), and in the second
case rule (λ-invk). In the first case, typing rule (t-invk) prescribes, for the expression e0, a type
T0 such that mtype(T0,m) = T1 . . .Tn → T . The validity of condition S1 (which assures type
preservation by Lemma 1), and Lemma 7 (1), imply that C <: T0, and the well-formedness of
the class table implies that mtype(C,m) = T1 . . .Tn → T . Other meta-variables for values can
be freely instantiated. In rule (up-cast) the meta-variable v can be freely instantiated.
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T ::= Nat | T1 → T2 | T1 ∧ T2 | T1 ∨ T2 type
(∧ I)
Γ ⊢ e : T Γ ⊢ e : S
Γ ⊢ e : T ∧ S
(∧ E)
Γ ⊢ e : T ∧ S
Γ ⊢ e : T
(∧ E)
Γ ⊢ e : T ∧ S
Γ ⊢ e : S
(∨ I)
Γ ⊢ e : T
Γ ⊢ e : T ∨ S
(∨ I)
Γ ⊢ e : S
Γ ⊢ e : T ∨ S
Figure 7: Intersection and union types: syntax and typing rules
5.3 Intersection and union types
We enrich the type system of Fig. 4 by adding intersection and union type constructors and
the corresponding typing rules, see Fig. 7. As usual we require an infinite number of arrows in
each infinite path for the trees representing types. Intersection types for the λ-calculus have
been widely studied [11]. Union types naturally model conditionals [27] and non-deterministic
choice [23].
The typing rules for the introduction and the elimination of intersection and union are stan-
dard, except for the absence of the union elimination rule:
(∨E)
Γ{T/x} ⊢ e : V Γ{S/x} ⊢ e : V Γ ⊢ e ′ : T ∨ S
Γ ⊢ e[e ′/x ] : V
As a matter of fact rule (∨E) is unsound for ⊕. For example, let split the type Nat into Even
and Odd and add the expected typings for natural numbers. The prefix addition + has type
(Even→ Even→ Even) ∧ (Odd→ Odd→ Even)
and we derive
x:Even ⊢+ xx:Even x:Odd ⊢+x x:Even
⊢ 1 : Odd
(∨ I)
⊢ 1 : Even ∨ Odd
⊢ 2 : Even
(∨ I)
⊢ 2 : Even ∨ Odd
(⊕)
⊢ (1⊕ 2) : Even ∨ Odd
(∨ E)
⊢+(1⊕ 2)(1 ⊕ 2) : Even
We cannot assign the type Even to 3, which is a possible result, so strong soundness is lost.
In the small-step approach, we cannot assign Even to the intermediate term +1 2, so subject
reduction fails. In the big-step approach, there is no such intermediate term; however, condition
S1 fails for the reduction rule for +. Indeed, considering the following instantiation of the rule:
(+)
1⊕ 2⇒ 1 1⊕ 2⇒ 2 3⇒ 3
+(1⊕ 2)(1 ⊕ 2)⇒ 3
and the type Even for the consequence, we cannot assign this type to the (configuration in) last
premise (continuation).
Intersection types allow to derive meaningful types also for expressions containing variables
applied to themselves, for example we can derive
⊢ λx .x x : (T → S ) ∧T → S
With union types all non-deterministic choices between typable expressions can be typed too,
since we can derive Γ ⊢ e1 ⊕ e2 : T1 ∨ T2 from Γ ⊢ e1 : T1 and Γ ⊢ e2 : T2.
In order to prove that the reduction rules satisfy the soundness conditions for the typing
system, standard lemmas are handy. We first define the subtyping relation T ≤ S as the
smallest preorder such that:
• T1 ≤ S and T2 ≤ S imply T1 ∧T2 ≤ S ;
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• T ∧ S ≤ T and T ∧ S ≤ S ;
• T ≤ T ∨ S and T ≤ S ∨ T .
It is easy to verify that T ≤ S iff Γ, e : T ⊢ e : S for an arbitrary e using rules (∧I), (∧E) and
(∨I).
Lemma 8 (Inversion).
1. If Γ ⊢ x : T, then Γ(x ) ≤ T.
2. If Γ ⊢ n : T, then Nat ≤ T.
3. If Γ ⊢ λx .e : T, then Γ{Si/x} ⊢ e : Vi for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and∧
1≤i≤m(Si → Vi) ≤ T.
4. If Γ ⊢ e1 e2 : T, then Γ ⊢ e1 : Si → Vi and Γ ⊢ e2 : Si for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and
∧
1≤i≤m Vi ≤ T.
5. If Γ ⊢ succ e : T, then Nat ≤ T and Γ ⊢ e : Nat.
6. If Γ ⊢ e1 ⊕ e2 : T, then Γ ⊢ ei : T with i ∈ 1, 2.
Proof. By induction on derivations and by cases on the last applied typing rule.
(3). If the last applied rule is (∧I), then T = T1 ∧ T2 and Γ ⊢ λx .e : Tj with j ∈ 1, 2. By IH
Γ{S
(j)
i /x} ⊢ e : V
(j)
i for 1 ≤ i ≤ mj and
∧
1≤i≤mj
(S
(j)
i → V
(j)
i ) ≤ Tj with j ∈ 1, 2. Then we
conclude ∧
1≤i≤m1
(S
(1)
i → V
(1)
i ) ∧
∧
1≤i≤m2
(S
(2)
i → V
(2)
i ) ≤ T1 ∧ T2.
(4). If the last applied rule is (∧I), then T = T1 ∧ T2 and Γ ⊢ e1 e2 : Tj with j ∈ 1, 2. By
IH Γ ⊢ e1 : S
(j)
i → V
(j)
i , and Γ ⊢ e2 : S
(j)
i , and for 1 ≤ i ≤ mj and
∧
1≤i≤mj
V
(j)
i ≤ Tj with
j ∈ 1, 2. Then we conclude∧
1≤i≤m1
V
(1)
i ∧
∧
1≤i≤m2
V
(2)
i ≤ T1 ∧ T2.
Lemma 9 (Substitution). If Γ{T ′/x} ⊢ e : T and Γ ⊢ e ′ : T ′, then Γ ⊢ e[e ′/x ] : T.
Lemma 10 (Canonical Forms).
1. If ⊢ v : T ′ → T, then v = λx .e.
2. If ⊢ v : Nat, then v = n.
In order to prove soundness, let Π3T (e) be ⊢ e : T , for T defined in Fig. 7.
Theorem 7 (Soundness). The big-step semantics R1 and the indexed predicate Π3 satisfy the
conditions S1, S2 and S3 of Sect. 4.2.
Proof. Condition S1. The proof is by cases on instantiations of meta-rules. For rule (app)
Lemma 8 (4) applied to ⊢ e1 e2 : T implies ⊢ e1 : Si → Vi and ⊢ e2 : Si for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and∧
1≤i≤m Vi ≤ T . As in the proof of Theorem 5 we get ⊢ λx .e : Si → Vi and ⊢ v2 : Si for
1 ≤ i ≤ m. Lemma 8 (3) implies x : Si ⊢ e : Vi, so by Lemma 9 we have ⊢ e[v2/x ] : Vi for
1 ≤ i ≤ m. We can derive ⊢ e[v2/x ] : T using rules (∧I), (∧E) and (∨I).
Condition S2. The proof is as in Theorem 5.
Condition S3. The proof is by cases on instantiations of meta-rules. For rule (app) Lemma 8
(4) applied to ⊢ e1 e2 : T implies ⊢ e1 : Si → Vi for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. If e1⇒ v we get ⊢ v : Si → Vi
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m as in the proof of Theorem 5. Lemma 10 (1) applied to ⊢ v : Si → Vi implies
v = λx .e and therefore the premises of the rule can be satisfied.
21
Soundness conditions for big-step semantics
5.4 MiniFJ&O
A well-known example in which proving soundness with respect to small-step semantics is
extremely challenging is the standard type system with intersection and union types [10] w.r.t.
the pure λ-calculus with full reduction. Indeed, the standard subject reduction technique
fails3, since, for instance, we can derive the type (T → T → V ) ∧ (S → S → V ) → (U →
T ∨ S ) → U → V for both λx.λy.λz.x((λt.t)(y z))((λt.t)(y z)) and λx.λy.λz.x(y z)(y z), but
the intermediate expressions λx.λy.λz.x((λt.t)(y z))(y z) and λx.λy.λz.x(y z)((λt.t)(y z)) do not
have this type.
As the example shows, the key problem is that rule (∨E) can be applied to expression e where
the same subexpression e ′ occurs more than once. In the non-deterministic case, as shown by
the example in the previous section, this is unsound, since e ′ can reduce to different values. In
the deterministic case, instead, this is sound, but cannot be proved by subject reduction. Since
using big-step semantics there are no intermediate steps to be typed, our approach seems very
promising to investigate an alternative proof of soundness. Whereas we leave this challenging
problem to future work, here as first step we describe a (hypothetical) calculus with a much
simpler version of the problematic feature.
The calculus is a variant of FJ [28] with intersection and union types. Methods have
intersection types with the same return type and different parameter types, modelling a form
of overloading. Union types enhance typability of conditionals. The more interesting feature is
the possibility of replacing an arbitrary number of parameters with the same expression having
an union type. We dub this calculus MiniFJ&O.
Fig. 8 gives the syntax, big-step semantics and typing rules of MiniFJ&O. We omit the
standard big-step rule for conditional, and typing rules for boolean constants.
The subtyping relation <: is the reflexive and transitive closure of the union of the extends
relation and the standard rules for union:
T1 <: T1 ∨ T2 T1 <: T2 ∨T1
On the other hand, method types (results of the mtype function) are now intersection types, and
the subtyping relation on them is the reflexive and transitive closure of the standard rules for
intersection:
MT 1 ∧MT 2 <: MT 1 MT 1 ∧MT 2 <:MT 2
The functions fields and mbody are defined as for MiniFJ&λ.
Instead mtype(C,m) gives, for each method m in class C, an intersection type. We assume
mbody(C,m) and mtype(C,m) either both defined or both undefined: in the first case
mbody(C,m)=〈x1 . . . xn, e〉, mtype(C,m)=
∧
1≤i≤m(C
(i)
1 . . .C
(i)
n → D)
and x1:C
(i)
1 , . . . , xn:C
(i)
n , this:C ⊢ e : D for i ∈ 1..m
Clearly rule (t-invk) is inspired by rule (∨E), but the restriction to method calls endows
a standard inversion lemma. The subtyping in this rule allows to choose the types for the
method best fitting the types of the arguments. Not surprisingly, subject reduction fails for
the expected small-step semantics. For example, let class C have a field point which contains
cartesian coordinates and class D have a field point which contains polar coordinates. The
method eq takes two objects and compares their point fields returning a boolean value. A type
for this method is (CC→ Bool) ∧ (DD→ Bool) and we can type eq(e, e), where
e = if false then new C( . . .) else new D( . . .)
In fact e has type C ∨ D. Notice that in a standard small-step semantics
3For this reason, in [10] soundness is proved by an ad-hoc technique, that is, by considering parallel reduction
and an equivalent type system a` la Gentzen, which enjoys the cut elimination property.
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e ::= x | v | e.f | e.m(e1, . . . , en) | if e then e1 else e2 expression
v ::= new C(v1, . . . , vn) | true | false value
T ::= C | Bool |
∨
1≤i≤n Ti expression type
MT ::=
∧
1≤i≤m(C
(i)
1 . . .C
(i)
n → D) method type
(field-access)
e⇒ new C(v1, . . . , vn)
e.fi⇒ vi
fields(C) = T1 f1; . . .Tn fn;
i ∈ 1..n
(new)
ei⇒ vi ∀i ∈ 1..n
new C(e1, . . . , en)⇒ new C(v1, . . . , vn)
(invk)
e0⇒ new C(vs
′)
ei⇒ vi ∀i ∈ 1..n
e[v1/x1] . . .[vn/xn][new C(vs
′)/this]⇒ v
e0.m(e1, . . . , en)⇒ v
mbody(C,m) = 〈x1 . . . xn, e〉
(field-access) rule(e⇒ new C(v1, . . . , vn), vi⇒ vi, e.fi) fields(C) = T1 f1; . . .Tn fn; i ∈ 1..n
(new) rule(es⇒ vs , new C(v1, . . . , vn)⇒ new C(v1, . . . , vn), new C(e1, . . . , en))
(invk) rule(e0⇒ new C(vs
′), es⇒ vs, e ′⇒ v , e0.m(e1, . . . , en))
e ′ = e[v1/x1] . . .[vn/xn][new C(vs
′)/this] mbody(C,m) = 〈x1 . . . xn, e〉
where es⇒ vs is short for e1⇒ v1, . . . , en⇒ vn
(t-var)
Γ ⊢ x : T
Γ(x) = T (t-field-access)
Γ ⊢ e : C
Γ ⊢ e.fi : Ci
fields(C) = T1 f1; . . .Tn fn;
i ∈ 1..n
(t-new)
Γ ⊢ ei : Ci ∀i ∈ 1..n
Γ ⊢ new C(e1, . . . , en) : C
fields(C) = T1 f1; . . .Tn fn;
(t-invk)
Γ ⊢ ei : Ci ∀i ∈ 0..n Γ ⊢ e :
∨
1≤i≤m Di
Γ ⊢ e0.m(e1, . . . , en, e, . . . , e︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
) : C
mtype(C0,m) <:∧
1≤i≤m(C1 . . .Cn Di . . .Di︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
→ C)
(t-if)
Γ ⊢ e : Bool Γ ⊢ e1 : T Γ ⊢ e2 : T
Γ ⊢ if e then e1 else e2 : T
(t-sub)
Γ ⊢ e : T
Γ ⊢ e : T ′
T <: T ′
Figure 8: MiniFJ&O: syntax, big-step semantics and type system
eq(e, e) −→ eq(new D( . . . ), if false then new C( . . . ) else new D( . . . ))
and this last expression cannot be typed.
As in previous examples the soundness proof uses an inversion lemma and a substitution
lemma, whereas the canonical form lemma is trivial, notably the only values of type C are
objects (constructor calls with values as arguments) of a subclass. We need instead a lemma
(dubbed key) which assures that a value typed by a union of classes can also be typed by one
of theses classes. The proof of this lemma is straightforward, since values are new constructors.
Lemma 11 (Inversion).
1. If Γ ⊢ x : T, then Γ(x ) <: T.
2. If Γ ⊢ e.fi : T, then Γ ⊢ e : C and fields(C) = C1 f1; . . .Cn fn; and Ci <: T where i ∈ 1..n.
3. If Γ ⊢ new C(e1, . . . , en) : T, then C <: T and fields(C) = C1 f1; . . .Cn fn; and Γ ⊢ ei : Ci
for all i ∈ 1..n.
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4. If Γ ⊢ e0.m(e1, . . . , en) : T, then n = q+p and Γ ⊢ ei : Ci for all i ∈ 0..q and eq+1 = . . . =
en = e and Γ ⊢ e :
∨
1≤i≤m Di and mtype(C0,m) <:
∧
1≤i≤m(C1 . . .CpDi . . .Di︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
→ C) with
C <: T.
5. If Γ ⊢ if e then e1 else e2 : T, then Γ ⊢ e : Bool and Γ ⊢ e1 : T and Γ ⊢ e2 : T.
Lemma 12 (Substitution). If Γ{T ′/x} ⊢ e : T and Γ ⊢ e ′ : T ′, then Γ ⊢ e[e ′/x ] : T ′.
Lemma 13 (Key). If Γ ⊢ v :
∨
1≤i≤n Ci, then Γ ⊢ v : Ci for some i ∈ 1 . . . n.
In order to prove soundness, let R4 be the big-step semantics defined in Fig. 8, and let
Π4T (e) hold if ⊢ e : T , for T defined in Fig. 8.
Theorem 8 (Soundness). The big-step semantics R4 and the indexed predicate Π4 satisfy the
conditions S1, S2 and S3 of Sect. 4.2.
Proof. Condition S1. The proof is by cases on instantiations of meta-rules. For rule (invk)
Lemma 11 (4) applied to ⊢ e0.m(e1, . . . , en) : T implies n = q + p and ⊢ ei : Ci for all i ∈ 0..q
and eq+1 = . . . = en = e and ⊢ e :
∨
1≤j≤m Dj and
mtype(C0,m) <:
∧
1≤j≤m(C1 . . .CpDj . . .Dj︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
→ C′)
with C′ <: T . Then we get ⊢ new C(vs ′) : C0 and ⊢ vi : Ci for i ∈ 1 . . . q and vq+1 = . . . =
vn = v
′ and ⊢ v ′ :
∨
1≤j≤m Dj , which implies ⊢ v
′ : Dj for some j ∈ 1 . . .m by Lemma 13.
The typing of the class table implies x1:C1, . . . , xq:Cq, xq+1 : Dj , . . . , xn : Dj , this:C ⊢ e : C
′ for
all j ∈ 1 . . .m. Lemma 12 gives ⊢ e[v1/x1] . . .[vn/xn][new C(vs ′)/this] : C
′. We can conclude
⊢ e[v1/x1] . . .[vn/xn][new C(vs ′)/this] : T using rule (t-sub).
Condition S2. All the closed expressions which are not values appear as conclusions in the
reduction rules.
Condition S3. Rules (field-access) and (invk) require that the expression in the first premise
reduces to an object for which the side-condition holds, and this can be proved exactly as in
the corresponding cases in Theorem 6, by using the typing rules (t-field-access), and (t-invk),
respectively, the validity of condition S1 (which assures type preservation by Lemma 1), the
fact that canonical forms of type C are objects of a subclass, and the well-formedness of the
class table. Other meta-variables for values can be freely instantiated.
5.5 Imperative FJ
In Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 we show a minimal imperative extension of FJ. We assume a well-typed
class table and we use the notations introduced in Sect. 5.2. Expressions are enriched with field
assignment and object identifiers ι, which only occur in runtime expressions. A memory µ maps
object identifiers to object states, which are expressions of shape new C(ι1, . . . ιn). Results are
configurations of shape 〈µ, ι〉. We denote by µ[ι.i=ι′] the memory obtained from µ by replacing
by ι′ the i-th field of the object state associated to ι. The type assignment Σ maps object
identifiers into types (class names). We write Σ ⊢ e : C for ∅; Σ ⊢ e : C. The subtyping relation
<: is the reflexive and transitive closure of the extends relation.
Lemma 14 (Inversion).
1. If Γ;Σ ⊢ 〈µ, e〉 : C, then Γ;Σ ⊢ µ(ι) : Σ(ι) for all ι ∈ dom(µ) and Σ ⊢ e : C and
dom(Σ) = dom(µ).
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e ::= x | e.f | new C(e1, . . . , en) | e.m(e1, . . . , en) | e.f=e
′ | ι expression
c ::= 〈µ, e〉 configuration
(field-access)
〈µ, e〉⇒ 〈µ′, ι〉
〈µ, e.fi〉⇒ 〈µ′, ιi〉
µ′(ι) = new C(ι1, . . . , ιn)
fields(C) = C1 f1; . . .Cn fn;
i ∈ 1..n
(new)
〈µi, ei〉⇒ 〈µi+1, ιi〉 ∀i ∈ 1..n
〈µ, new C(e1, . . . , en)〉⇒ 〈µ′, ι〉
µ1 = µ
µ′ = µn+1{new C(ι1, . . . , ιn)/ι}
ι fresh
(invk)
〈µi, ei〉⇒ 〈µi+1, ιi〉 ∀i ∈ 0..n
〈µn+1, e[ι1/x1] . . .[ιn/xn][ι0/this]〉⇒ 〈µ
′, ι〉
〈µ, e0.m(e1, . . . , en)〉⇒ 〈µ′, ι〉
µ0 = µ
µ1(ι0) = new C( )
mbody(C,m) = 〈x1 . . . xn, e〉
µ′ = µn+1
(field-assign)
〈µ, e〉⇒ 〈µ′, ι〉 〈µ′, e ′〉⇒ 〈µ′′, ι′〉
〈µ, e.fi=e ′〉⇒
〈
µ′′[ι.i=ι′], ι
′
〉
µ(ι) = new C(ι1, . . . , ιn)
fields(C) = C1 f1; . . .Cn fn;
i ∈ 1..n
(field-access) rule(〈µ, e〉⇒ 〈µ′, ι〉, 〈µ′, ιi〉⇒ 〈µ
′, ιi〉, 〈µ, e.fi〉)
µ′(ι) = new C(ι1, . . . , ιn)
fields(C) = C1 f1; . . .Cn fn;
i ∈ 1..n
(new) rule(〈µi, ei〉⇒ 〈µi+1, ιi〉 ∀i ∈ 1..n, 〈µ
′, ι〉⇒ 〈µ′, ι〉, 〈µ, new C(e1, . . . , en)〉)
µ1 = µ
µ′ = µn+1{new C(ι1, . . . , ιn)/ι}
ι fresh
(invk) rule(〈µi, ei〉⇒ 〈µi+1, ιi〉 ∀i ∈ 0..n, 〈µn+1, e
′〉⇒ 〈µ′, ι〉, 〈µ, e0.m(e1, . . . , en)〉)
µ0 = µ
µ1(ι0) = new C( )
mbody(C,m) = 〈x1 . . . xn, e〉
e ′ = e[ι1/x1] . . .[ιn/xn][ι0/this]
µ′ = µn+1
(field-assign) rule(〈µ, e〉⇒ 〈µ′, ι〉 〈µ′, e ′〉⇒ 〈µ′′, ι′〉, 〈µ′′′, ι′〉⇒ 〈µ′′′, ι′〉, 〈µ, e.fi=e
′〉)
µ(ι) = new C(ι1, . . . , ιn)
fields(C) = C1 f1; . . .Cn fn;
i ∈ 1..n
µ′′′ = µ′′[ι.i=ι′]
Figure 9: Imperative FJ: syntax and big-step semantics
2. If Γ;Σ ⊢ x : C, then Γ(x ) <: C.
3. If Γ;Σ ⊢ e.fi : C, then Γ;Σ ⊢ e : D and fields(D) = C1 f1; . . .Cn fn; and Ci <: C where
i ∈ 1..n.
4. If Γ;Σ ⊢ new C(e1, . . . , en) : D, then C <: D and fields(C) = C1 f1; . . .Cn fn; and Γ;Σ ⊢
ei : Ci for all i ∈ 1..n.
5. If Γ;Σ ⊢ e0.m(e1, . . . , en) : C, then Γ;Σ ⊢ ei : Ci for all i ∈ 0..n and mtype(C0,m) =
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(t-conf)
Σ ⊢ µ(ι) : Σ(ι) ∀ι ∈ dom(µ) Σ ⊢ e : C
Σ ⊢ 〈µ, e〉 : C
dom(Σ) = dom(µ)
(t-var)
Γ;Σ ⊢ x : C
Γ(x) = C
(t-field-access)
Γ;Σ ⊢ e : C
Γ;Σ ⊢ e.fi : Ci
fields(C) = C1 f1; . . .Cn fn;
i ∈ 1..n
(t-new)
Γ;Σ ⊢ ei : Ci ∀i ∈ 1..n
Γ;Σ ⊢ new C(e1, . . . , en) : C
fields(C) = C1 f1; . . .Cn fn;
(t-invk)
Γ; Σ ⊢ ei : Ci ∀i ∈ 0..n
Γ;Σ ⊢ e0.m(e1, . . . , en) : C
mtype(C0,m) = C1 . . .Cn → C
(t-field-assign)
Γ; Σ ⊢ e : C
Γ; Σ ⊢ e ′ : Ci
Γ;Σ ⊢ e.fi=e ′ : Ci
fields(C) = C1 f1; . . .Cn fn;
i ∈ 1..n
(t-oid)
Γ;Σ ⊢ ι : C
Σ(ι) = C (t-sub)
Γ;Σ ⊢ e : C
Γ;Σ ⊢ e : C′
C <: C′
Figure 10: Imperative FJ: typing rules
C1 . . .Cn → D with D <: C.
6. If Γ;Σ ⊢ e.fi=e ′ : C, then Γ;Σ ⊢ e : D and fields(D) = C1 f1; . . .Cn fn; and Γ;Σ ⊢ e ′ : Ci
and Ci <: C.
7. If Γ;Σ ⊢ ι : C, then Σ(ι) <: C.
Lemma 15 (Substitution). If Γ{C′/x}; Σ ⊢ e : C and Γ;Σ ⊢ e ′ : C′, then Γ;Σ ⊢ e[e ′/x ] : C.
We can prove the soundness of the indexed predicate ΠC defined by: Π〈Σ,C〉(〈µ, e〉) holds if
Σ′ ⊢ 〈µ, e〉 : C for some Σ′ such that Σ ⊆ Σ′. The type assignment Σ′ is needed, since memory
can grow during evaluation.
Theorem 9 (Soundness). The big-step semantics of Fig. 9 and the indexed predicate Π〈Σ,C〉
satisfy the conditions S1, S2 and S3 of Sect. 4.2.
Proof. Condition S1. The proof is by cases on instantiations of meta-rules.
Rule (field-access). Lemma 14 (1) applied to Σ ⊢ 〈µ, e.fi〉 : C implies Σ ⊢ µ(ι) : Σ(ι) for all ι ∈
dom(µ) and Σ ⊢ e.fi : C and dom(Σ) = dom(µ). Lemma 14 (3) applied to Σ ⊢ e.fi : C implies
Σ ⊢ e : D and fields(D) = C1 f1; . . .Cn fn; and Ci <: C where i ∈ 1..n. Since 〈µ, e〉⇒ 〈µ
′, ι〉
is a premise we assume Σ′ ⊢ 〈µ′, ι〉 : D with Σ ⊆ Σ′. Lemma 14 (1) and Lemma 14 (7) imply
Σ′(ι) <: D. Lemma 14 (4) allows us to get µ′(ι) = new C′(ι1, . . . ιm) with n ≤ m and C
′ <: D
and Σ′ ⊢ ιi : Ci. So we conclude Σ′ ⊢ 〈µ′, ιi〉 : C by rules (t-sub) and (t-conf).
Rule (new). Lemma 14 (1) applied to Σ ⊢ 〈µ, new C(e1, . . . , en)〉 : D implies Σ ⊢ µ(ι) : Σ(ι) for
all ι ∈ dom(µ) and Σ ⊢ new C(e1, . . . , en) : D and dom(Σ) = dom(µ). Lemma 14 (4) applied to
Σ ⊢ new C(e1, . . . , en) : D implies C <: D and fields(C) = C1 f1; . . .Cn fn; and Σ ⊢ ei : Ci for
all i ∈ 1..n. Since 〈µ, ei〉⇒ 〈µi+1, ιi〉 is a premise we assume Σi ⊢ 〈µi+1, ιi〉 : Ci for all i ∈ 1..n
with Σ ⊆ Σ1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Σn. Lemma 14 (1) and Lemma 14 (7) imply Σi(ιi) <: Ci for all i ∈ 1..n.
Using rules (t-oid), (t-new) and (t-sub) we derive Σn ⊢ new C(ι1, . . . , ιn) : D. We then conclude
Σn, ι : D ⊢ 〈µn+1, ι〉 : D by rules (t-oid)and (t-conf).
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Rule (invk). Lemma 14 (1) applied to Σ0 ⊢ 〈µ0, e0.m(e1, . . . , en)〉 : C implies Σ0 ⊢ µ0(ι) : Σ0(ι)
for all ι ∈ dom(µ0) and Σ0 ⊢ e0.m(e1, . . . , en) : C and dom(Σ0) = dom(µ0). Lemma 14 (5)
applied to Σ0 ⊢ e0.m(e1, . . . , en) : C implies Σi ⊢ ei : Ci for all i ∈ 0..n and mtype(C0,m) =
C1 . . .Cn → D with D <: C. Since 〈µi, ei〉⇒ 〈µi+1, ιi〉 is a premise we assume Σi ⊢ 〈µi+1, ιi〉 :
Ci for all i ∈ 0..n with Σ0 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Σn. Lemma 14 (1) gives Σi ⊢ ιi : Ci for all i ∈ 0..n. The typing
of the class table implies x1:C1, . . . , xn:Cn, this:C0 ⊢ e : D. Lemma 15 gives Σn ⊢ e ′ : D where
e ′ = e[ι1/x1] . . .[ιn/xn][ι0/this]. Using rules (t-sub) and (t-conf) we derive Σn ⊢ 〈µn+1, e
′〉 : C.
Since 〈µn+1, e ′〉⇒ 〈µ′, ι〉 is a premise we conclude Σ′ ⊢ 〈µ′, ι〉 : C with Σn ⊆ Σ′.
Rule (field-assign). Lemma 14 (1) applied to Σ ⊢ 〈µ, e.fi=e ′〉 : C implies Σ ⊢ µ(ι) : Σ(ι)
for all ι ∈ dom(µ) and Σ ⊢ e.fi=e ′ : C and dom(Σ) = dom(µ). Lemma 14 (6) applied to
Σ ⊢ e.fi=e ′ : C implies Σ ⊢ e : D and fields(D) = C1 f1; . . .Cn fn; and Σ ⊢ e ′ : Ci and
Ci <: C. Since 〈µ, e〉⇒ 〈µ′, ι〉 and 〈µ′, e ′〉⇒ 〈µ′′, ι′〉 are premises we assume Σ′ ⊢ 〈µ′, ι〉 : D
and Σ′′ ⊢ 〈µ′′, ι′〉 : Ci, with Σ ⊆ Σ′ ⊆ Σ′′. Notice that µ′′(ι) and µ′′[ι.i=ι′](ι) have the same types
for all ι by construction. We conclude Σ′′ ⊢
〈
µ′′[ι.i=ι′], ι
′
〉
: Ci.
Condition S2. All the closed expressions which are not values appear as conclusions in the
reduction rules.
Condition S3. Rule (field-access) requires that 〈µ, e〉 reduces to 〈µ′, ι〉 such that µ′(ι) =
new D(ι1, . . . , ιm), fields(D) = C1 f1; . . .Cm fm;, and i ∈ 1..m. Since the configuration in the
consequence is well-typed in Σ, by Lemma 14 (1) and Lemma 14 (3) we have Σ ⊢ e : C and
fields(C) = C1 f1; . . .Cn fn;, and i ∈ 1..n. The validity of condition S1 (which assures type
preservation by Lemma 1) implies that Σ′ ⊢ 〈µ′, ι〉 : D with Σ ⊆ Σ′ and D subclass of C, hence,
by rules (t-conf) and (t-oid), Σ′ ⊢ µ′(ι) : D, and the well-formedness of the class table implies
that fields(D) = C1 f1; . . .Cm fm; with n ≤ m, hence i ∈ 1..m.
Rules (invk) and (field-assign) require that the expression in the first premise reduces to an object
identifier for which the side-conditions hold, and this can be proved analogously. Other meta-
variables for results can be freely instantiated.
6 The partial evaluation construction
In this section, our aim is to provide a formal justification that the constructions in Sect. 3 are
correct. For instance, for the wrong semantics we would like to be sure that all the cases are
covered. To this end, we define a third construction, dubbed pev for “partial evaluation”, which
makes explicit the computations of a big-step semantics, intended as the sequences of execution
steps of the naturally associated evaluation algorithm. Formally, we obtain a reduction relation
on approximated proof trees, so non-termination and stuck computation are distinguished, and
both soundness-must and soundness-may can be expressed.
To this end, first of all we introduce a special result ?, so that a judgment c⇒ ? (called
incomplete, whereas a judgment in R is complete) means that the evaluation of c is not com-
pleted yet. Analogously to the previous constructions, we define an augmented set of rules R?
for the judgment extended with ?:
? introduction rules These rules derive ? whenever a rule is partially applied: for each rule
ρ ≡ rule(j1 . . . jn, jn+1, c) in R, index i ∈ 1..n + 1, and result r ∈ R, we define the rule
intro?(ρ, i, r) as
j1 . . . ji−1 C (ji)⇒ r
c⇒ ?
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(r?)
r⇒ ?
R
−−−→ (r)
r⇒ r
(c?)
c⇒ ?
R
−−−→ (prop(ρ,1,?))
c′⇒ ?
c⇒ ?
C (ρ) = c
C (ρ, 1) = c′
(intro?(ρ, i, r))
τ1 . . . τi
c⇒ ?
R
−−−→ (ρ′)
τ1 . . . τi
c⇒ r
ρ′ ∼i ρ
R(ρ′, i) = r
#ρ′ = i
(intro?(ρ, i, r))
τ1 . . . τi
c⇒ ?
R
−−−→ (prop(ρ′,i+1,?))
τ1 . . . τi c
′⇒ ?
c⇒ ?
ρ′ ∼i ρ
R(ρ′, i) = r
C (ρ′, i+ 1) = c′
(prop(ρ,i,?))
τ1 . . . τi
c⇒ ?
R
−−−→ (prop(ρ,i,?))
τ1 . . . τi−1 τ
′
i
c⇒ ?
τi
R
−−−→τ ′i
R?(r(τ
′
i)) = ?
(prop(ρ,i,?))
τ1 . . . τi
c⇒ ?
R
−−−→ (intro?(ρ, i, r))
τ1 . . . τi−1 τ
′
i
c⇒ ?
τi
R
−−−→τ ′i
R?(r(τ
′
i)) = r
Figure 11: Reduction relation on T
We also add an axiom
c⇒ ?
for each configuration c ∈ C .
? propagation rules These rules propagate ? analogously to those for divergence and wrong
propagation: for each ρ ≡ rule(j1 . . . jn, jn+1, c) in R, and index i ∈ 1..n+ 1, we add the
rule prop(ρ, i, ?) as follows:
j1 . . . ji−1 C (ji)⇒ ?
c⇒ ?
Finally, we consider the set T of the (finite) proof trees τ in R?. Each τ can be thought as a
partial proof or partial evaluation of the root configuration. In particular, we say it is complete
if it is a proof tree in R (that is, it only contains complete judgments), incomplete otherwise.
We define a reduction relation
R
−−−→ on T such that, starting from the initial proof tree
c⇒ ?
,
we derive a sequence where, intuitively, at each step we detail the proof (evaluation). In this
way, a sequence ending with a complete tree
. . .
c⇒ r
models terminating computation, whereas
an infinite sequence (tending to an infinite proof tree) models divergence, and a stuck sequence
models a stuck computation.
The one-step reduction relation
R
−−−→ on T is inductively defined by the rules in Fig. 11. In
this figure #ρ denotes the number of premises of ρ, and r(τ) the root of τ . We set R?(c⇒ u) = u
where u ∈ R ∪ {?}. Finally, ∼i is the equivalence up-to an index of rules, introduced at the
beginning of Sect. 3.2. As said above, each reduction step makes “less incomplete” the proof
tree. Notably, reduction rules apply to nodes with consequence c⇒ ?, whereas subtrees with
root c⇒ r represent terminated evaluation. In detail:
• If the last applied rule is an axiom, and the configuration is a result r , then we can
evaluate r to itself. Otherwise, we have to find a rule ρ with c in the consequence and
start evaluating the first premise of such rule.
• If the last applied rule is intro?(ρ, i, r), then all subtrees are complete, hence, to continue
the evaluation, we have to find another rule ρ′, having, for each k ∈ 1..i, as k-th premise
the root of τk. Then there are two possibilities: if there is an i + 1-th premise, we start
evaluating it, otherwise, we propagate to the conclusion the result r of τi.
• If the last applied rule is a propagation rule prop(ρ, i, ?), then we simply propagate the
step made by τi.
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(λx .x) n⇒ ?
R
−−−→
λx .x ⇒ ?
(λx .x) n⇒ ?
R
−−−→
λx .x ⇒ λx .x
(λx .x) n⇒ ?
R
−−−→
λx .x ⇒ λx .x n⇒ ?
(λx .x) n⇒ ?
R
−−−→
λx .x ⇒ λx .x n⇒ n
(λx .x) n⇒ ?
R
−−−→
λx .x ⇒ λx .x n⇒ n n⇒ ?
(λx .x) n⇒ ?
R
−−−→
λx .x ⇒ λx .x n⇒ n n⇒ n
(λx .x) n⇒ ?
R
−−−→
λx .x ⇒ λx .x n⇒ n n⇒ n
(λx .x) n⇒ n
Figure 12: The evaluation in pev of (λx .x ) n.
In Fig. 12 we report an example of pev reduction.
The remaining of this section is split into three parts. In Sect. 6.1 we show properties of
proof trees starting from a formal account of them. The coherence of our approach through
the equivalence of the three constructions is the content of Sect. 6.2. Lastly Sect. 6.3 discusses
soundness of pev semantics.
6.1 Properties of proof trees
We give a formal account of proof trees, which is useful to state and to prove following technical
results. The account follows [18, 20], but it is adjusted to our specific setting.
Set N>0 the set of positive natural numbers and L a set of labels. A tree labelled in L is
a partial function τ : N⋆>0 → L such that dom(τ) is not empty, and, for each α ∈ N
⋆
>0 and
n ∈ N>0, if αn ∈ dom(τ) then α ∈ dom(τ) and, for all k ≤ n, αk ∈ dom(τ). Given a tree
τ and α ∈ dom(τ), set brτ (α) = max{n ∈ N | αn ∈ dom(τ)} the branching of τ at α, and
τ|α the subtree of τ rooted at α, that is, τ|α(β) = τ(αβ). In particular, τ(ε) = r(τ) is the
root of τ . Finally, we write
τ1 . . . τn
j
for the tree τ defined by τ(ε) = j , and τ(iα) = τi(α)
for all i ∈ 1..n.
Assume now that labels in L are the judgments of an inference system I (where premises of
rules are sorted). Then, a tree labelled in L is a proof tree in I if, for each α ∈ dom(τ), there
is a rule
τ(α1) . . . τ(αbrτ (α))
τ(α)
∈ I.
The following proposition assures two key properties of proof trees in R?. First, if there is
some ?, then it is propagated to ancestor nodes. Second, for each level of the tree there is at
most one ?. We set |α| the length of α ∈ N⋆>0.
Proposition 4. Let τ be a proof tree in R?, then the following hold:
1. for all αn ∈ dom(τ), if R?(τ(αn)) = ? then R?(τ(α)) = ?.
2. for all n ∈ N, there is at most one α ∈ dom(τ) with |α| = n such that R?(τ(α)) = ?.
Proof. To prove 1, it is enough to note that the only rules having a premise j with R?(j ) = ?
are ?-propagation rules, which also have conclusion j ′ with R?(j
′) = ?; hence the thesis is
immediate. To prove 2, we proceed by induction on n. For n = 0, there is only one α ∈ N⋆>0
with |α| = 0, hence the thesis is trivial. Consider α = α′k ∈ dom(τ) with |α| = n + 1; if
R?(τ(α)) = ?, then, by point 1, R?(τ(α
′)) = ?, and α′ is unique by induction hypothesis.
Therefore, another node β ∈ dom(τ), with |β| = n+ 1 and R?(τ(β)) = ?, must satisfy β = α
′h
for some h ∈ N>0; hence, since τ is a proof tree, τ(α) and τ(β) are two premises of the same rule
with ? as result, thus they must coincide, since the rules have at most one premise with ?.
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Corollary 1. Let τ be a finite proof tree in R?, then R?(r(τ)) ∈ R implies τ is complete.
As said above, the definition of
R
−−−→ given in Fig. 11 nicely models a “small-step” version
of an interpreter driven by the big-step rules. In other words, the one-step reduction relation on
T specifies an algorithm of incremental proof/ evaluation.4 However, to carry out some proofs
on pev semantics, it is convenient to consider a more abstract relation.
The relation ⊑ on (finite or infinite) trees5 labelled by semantic judgements is defined by:
τ ⊑ τ ′ if dom(τ) ⊆ dom(τ ′)
for all α ∈ dom(τ), C (τ(α)) = C (τ ′(α)) and R?(τ(α)) ∈ R implies τ|α = τ
′
|α
.
Intuitively, τ ⊑ τ ′ means that τ ′ can be obtained from τ by adding new branches or replacing
some ?s with results. We use ⊏ for the strict version of ⊑. It is easy to check that ⊑ is a partial
order and, if τ ⊑ τ ′, then, for all α ∈ dom(τ), τ|α ⊑ τ
′
|α
. The following proposition shows
some, less trivial, properties of ⊑.
Proposition 5. The following properties hold:
1. for all trees τ and τ ′, if τ ⊑ τ ′ and R?(r(τ)) ∈ R, then τ = τ ′
2. for each increasing sequence (τi)i∈N of trees, there is a least upper bound τ =
⊔
τn.
Proof. Point 1 is immediate by definition of ⊑. To prove point 2, first note that, since for all
n ∈ N, τn ⊑ τn+1, for all α ∈ N⋆>0 we have that, for all n ∈ N, if τn(α) is defined, then, for all
k ≥ n, C (τk(α)) = C (τn(α)), and, if R?(τn(α)) ∈ R, then τk(α) = τn(α). Hence, for all n ∈ N,
there are only three possibilities for τn(α): it is either undefined, or equal to c⇒ ?, or equal to
c⇒ r , where the configuration is the same. Let us denote by kα the least index where τn(α)
is most defined, hence, for all n ≥ kα, we have that τn(α) = τkα(α). Then, consider a tree τ
defined by τ(α) = τkα(α). It is easy to check that dom(τ) =
⋃
n∈N dom(τn). We now check
that, for all n ∈ N, τn ⊑ τ . For all α ∈ dom(τn), we have α ∈ dom(τ) and we distinguish two
cases:
• if τn(α) = c⇒ ?, then kα ≥ n, hence, since τn ⊑ τkα , we get C (τ(α)) = C (τkα (α)) =
C (τn(α)) = c
• if τn(α) = c⇒ r , then kα ≤ n, hence, since τkα ⊑ τn, we get C (τ(α)) = C (τkα(α)) =
C (τn(α)) = c, thus we have only to check that τn|α = τ|α , that is easy, because, for all
β ∈ dom(τn|α), we have τn|α(β) = τn(αβ) = c
′⇒ r ′, hence kαβ ≥ n, hence τ|α(β) =
τ(αβ) = τkαβ (αβ) = τn(αβ), as needed.
This proves that τ is an upper bound of the sequence, we have still to prove that it is the least
one. To this end, let τ ′ be an upper bound of the sequence: we have to show that τ ⊑ τ ′. Since
τ ′ is an upper bound, for all n ∈ N we have dom(τn) ⊆ dom(τ ′), hence dom(τ) ⊆ dom(τ ′),
and, especially, for all α ∈ N⋆>0 we have τkα ⊑ τ
′. Hence, for all α ∈ dom(τ), we have
C (τ(α)) = C (τkα(α)) = C (τ
′(α)), and, if R?(τ(α)) = r , since τkα ⊑ τ and τkα ⊑ τ
′, we have
τkα |α
= τ|α and τkα |α
= τ ′|α , hence τ|α = τ
′
|α
as needed.
Finally, the next proposition formally proves that ⊑ is an abstraction of
R
−−−→.
Proposition 6. For all τ, τ ′ ∈ T , the following hold:
4Non-determinism can only be caused by intrinsic non-determinism of the big-step semantics, if any.
5A slight variation of analogous relations is considered in [18, 20].
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1. if τ
R
−−−→τ ′ then τ ⊏ τ ′
2. if τ ⊑ τ ′ then τ
R
−−−→⋆τ ′.
Proof. Point 1 can be easily proved by induction on the definition of
R
−−−→. To prove point
2, we proceed by induction on τ ′. We can assume R?(r(τ)) = ?, since in the other case, by
Prop. 5(1), we have τ = τ ′, hence the thesis is trivial. We can also assume R?(r(τ
′)) = ?, since,
if τ ′ =
τ ′1 . . . τ
′
n
c⇒ r
, then we always have τ ′′ =
τ ′1 . . . τ
′
n
c⇒ ?
R
−−−→τ ′ and τ ⊑ τ ′′. Now, if
τ ′ =
c⇒ ?
(base case), then, since dom(τ) ⊆ dom(τ ′) and C (r(τ)) = C (r(τ ′)) by definition
of ⊑, we have τ = τ ′, hence the thesis is trivial.
Let us assume τ =
τ1 . . . τk
c⇒ ?
and τ ′ =
τ ′1 . . . τ
′
i
c⇒ ?
, with, necessarily, k ≤ i by definition
of ⊑. By Prop. 4 (2), at most τk is incomplete, hence, for all h < k, τh is complete, hence
R?(r(τh)) ∈ R, thus, by definition of ⊑, we have τh = τ ′h. We now show, concluding the
proof, by induction on i − k, that τ
R
−−−→⋆τ ′. Since τk ⊑ τ
′
k, by HI, we get τk
R
−−−→⋆τ ′k, hence
τ
R
−−−→⋆τ ′′ =
τ ′1 . . . τ
′
k
c⇒ ?
. If i − k = 0, hence i = k, we have τ ′′ = τ ′, hence the thesis is
immediate. If i − k > 0, hence i > k, again by Prop. 4(2), we have R?(r(τk)) ∈ R, hence
τ ′′
R
−−−→
τ ′1 . . . τ
′
k c
′⇒ ?
c⇒ ?
= τˆ , where c′ = C (r(τ ′k+1)). Finally, by HI, we get τˆ
R
−−−→⋆τ ′,
as needed.
6.2 Equivalence of traces, wrong and pev semantics
We prove the three constructions to be equivalent to each other, thus providing a coherency
result of the approach. In particular, first we show that pev is conservative with respect to R,
and this ensures the three constructions are equivalent for finite computations. Then, we prove
traces and wrong constructions to be equivalent to pev for diverging and stuck computations,
respectively, and this ensures they cover all possible cases.
Theorem 10. R ⊢ c⇒ r iff
c⇒ ?
R
−−−→⋆τ , where r(τ) = c⇒ r.
Proof. R ⊢ c⇒ r implies
c⇒ ?
R
−−−→⋆τ where r(τ) = c⇒ r . By definition, if R ⊢ c⇒ r
holds, then there is a finite proof tree τ in R such that r(τ) = c⇒ r . Since R ⊆ R?, τ is a
proof tree in R? as well; furthermore,
c⇒ ?
⊑ τ , hence by Prop. 6 (2) we get the thesis.
c⇒ ?
R
−−−→⋆τ where r(τ) = c⇒ r implies R ⊢ c⇒ r . Since r(τ) = c⇒ r , by Corollary 1, τ is
complete, hence, it is a proof tree in R, thus R ⊢ c⇒ r holds.
To relate trace semantics with pev, first we show that, in the pev semantics, proof trees
obtained as limits of infinite sequences of
R
−−−→ steps can be characterised as the infinite proof
trees which are well-formed, in the sense that there is a unique infinite path, entirely labelled
by incomplete judgments. Formally, τ is well-formed, if, for all n ∈ N, there is α ∈ dom(τ) such
that |α| = n and τ(α) = c⇒ ? for some c ∈ C , and, for all α ∈ dom(τ), if R?(τ(α)) ∈ R, then
τ|α is finite.
Proposition 7. The following properties hold:
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1. for each increasing sequence (τn)n∈N of proof trees, the least upper bound
⊔
τn is a
proof tree
2. for each strictly increasing sequence (τn)n∈N of finite proof trees, the least upper bound⊔
τn is infinite and well-formed
3. for each well-formed infinite proof tree τ , there is a strictly increasing sequence (τn)n∈N
of finite proof trees such that τ =
⊔
τn.
Proof. To prove point 1, set τ =
⊔
τn and recall from Prop. 5 (2) that τ(α) = τkα(α), where
kα ∈ N is the least index n where τn(α) is most defined. Note that, for all α ∈ dom(τ), brτ (α)
is finite, since, by definition of τ , we have brτ (α) = max{brτn(α) | α ∈ dom(τn)}, and this value
is bounded because brτn(α) is the number of premises of a rule, which is bounded by definition,
see condition BP at page 3. Then, since brτ (α) is finite, there is an index n ∈ N such that
brτ (α) = brτn(α), and, especially, this holds for n = max{kα, kαbrτ (α)}. Therefore, we have that
τ(α1) . . . τ(αbrτ (α))
τ(α)
=
τn(α1) . . . τn(αbrτ (α))
τn(α)
∈ R?, since τn is a proof tree in R?.
To prove point 2, set τ =
⊔
τn, then, by point 1, we have that τ is a proof tree, hence we
have only to check it is infinite and well-formed. Since the sequence is strictly increasing, we
have that for all n ∈ N there is h > n such that dom(τn) ⊂ dom(τh). This can be proved by
induction on the number of ? in τ , which is finite since τn is finite, noting that, if dom(τn) =
dom(τn+1), since τn ⊏ τn+1, there is at least one node α ∈ dom(τn) such that R?(τn(α)) = ? and
R?(τn+1(α)) = r . Therefore, dom(τ) =
⋃
n∈N dom(τn) is infinite, that is, τ is infinite. To show
that τ is well-formed, first note that for all α ∈ dom(τ) such that τ(α) = c⇒ r , since τkα ⊑ τ
and τkα(α) = τ(α), by definition of ⊑, we get τkα |α
= τ|α , hence, τ|α is finite. Then, we still have
only to prove that, for each n ∈ N, there is α ∈ dom(τ) such that |α| = n and R?(τ(α)) = ?. We
proceed by induction on n. For n = 0, we have R?(r(τ)) = ?, since, otherwise, we would have
R?(r(τkε )) = r , hence, by Prop. 5 (1), we would get τkε = τkε+1 which is not possible, because
the sequence is strictly increasing. Now, by induction hypothesis, we know there is α ∈ dom(τ)
such that |α| = n and R?(τ(α)) = ?. By Prop. 4 (1), we also know that, if there is β ∈ dom(τ)
such that |β| = n+1 and R?(τ(β)) = ?, then β = αh for some h ∈ N>0. If such h did not exist,
then, for all k ∈ N>0 such that αk ∈ dom(τ), we would have R?(τ(αk)) ∈ R, hence, as we have
just proved, τ|αk would be finite, and this would imply that τ is finite, which is not possible.
Hence, τ is well-formed as needed.
To prove point 3, for all n ∈ N, consider the proof tree τn defined as follows: let αn ∈ dom(τ)
be the (unique thanks to Prop. 4 (2)) node such that |αn| = n and R?(τ(αn)) = ?, then define
τn(β) = τ(β) for all β 6= αnβ′, with β′ ∈ N
+
>0, and undefined otherwise. We have τn ⊑ τn+1,
since, by Prop. 4 (1), αn+1 = αni for some i ∈ N>0. Finally, by construction, we have τ =
⊔
τn,
as needed.
Then, we define a function erase that transforms a proof tree in Rtr in one in R?, by
essentially erasing traces. The definition is given coinductively by the following equations:
erase
(
(r)
r⇒tr r
)
= (r)
r⇒ r
erase
(
(trace(ρ, t1, ..., tn+1))
τ1 . . . τn+1
c⇒tr t′ · r
)
= (ρ)
erase (τ1) . . . erase (τn+1)
c⇒ r
erase
(
(prop(ρ, i, t1, ..., ti−1, t))
τ1 . . . τi
c⇒tr t′
)
= (prop(ρ,i,?))
erase (τ1) . . . erase (τi)
c⇒ ?
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By construction, erase (τ) is a proof tree in R? and it is infinite and well-formed iff τ
is infinite.
Lemma 16. If Rtr ⊢ c⇒tr t holds by an infinite proof tree τ tr, then there is a sequence (τ ′n)n∈N
such that τ ′n
R
−−−→τ ′n+1 for all n ∈ N, τ
′
0 = c⇒ ?
, and
⊔
τ ′n = erase (τ
tr).
Proof. Since τ tr is infinite, erase (τ tr) = τ is a well-formed infinite proof treee in R? and, by
Prop. 7 (3), there is a strictly increasing sequence (τn)n∈N of finite proof trees in R? such that⊔
τn = τ and τ0 =
c⇒ ?
. By Prop. 6 (2), since for all n ∈ N we have τn ⊏ τn+1, we
get τn
R
−−−→⋆τn+1, and, since τn 6= τn+1, this sequence of steps is not empty. Hence, we can
construct a sequence (τ ′n)n∈N such that τ
′
0 = c⇒ ?
, τ ′n
R
−−−→τ ′n+1 and
⊔
τ ′n = τ , as needed.
Lemma 17. If τ is a well-formed infinite proof tree in R? with r(τ) = c⇒ ?, then there is an
infinite trace tτ ∈ Cω and an infinite proof tree τ tr in Rtr such that r(τ tr) = c⇒tr tτ .
Proof. Let us denote by αn the (unique thanks to Prop. 4 (2)) node in τ such that |αn| = n
and τ(αn) = cn⇒ ?, and denote by ρˆn ≡ prop(ρn, kn, ?) the rule applied at αn, where ρn ≡
rule(jn1 . . . j
n
hn
, jnhn+1, cn) and kn ≤ hn +1. Since τ is well-formed, for all k < kn, we have τ|αnk
is finite, hence it is a valid proof tree in R, thus R ⊢ jnk holds, and C (j
n
kn
) = cn+1 by Prop. 4.
Then, the set S = {cn | n ∈ N} with the rules ρn and indexes kn satisfies the hypothesis
of Lemma 2, hence we get that, for all n ∈ N, there is an infinite trace tn ∈ Cω such that
Rtr ⊢ cn⇒tr tn. Now, set t = t0, since c = c0 by construction, we have just proved that c⇒tr t
is derivable in Rtr by a proof tree τ tr and, since t is infinite, τ tr is infinite as well.
Theorem 11. Rtr ⊢ c⇒tr t for some t ∈ Cω iff
c⇒ ?
R
−−−→ω.
Proof. Rtr ⊢ c⇒tr t for some t ∈ Cω implies
c⇒ ?
R
−−−→ω. Since Rtr ⊢ c⇒tr t holds and t
is infinite, by (a consequence of) Prop. 1, there is an infinite proof tree τ tr in Rtr such that
r(τ tr) = c⇒tr t. Then by Lemma 16 we get the thesis.
c⇒ ?
R
−−−→ω implies Rtr ⊢ c⇒tr t for some t ∈ Cω . By definition of
R
−−−→ω, there is an infinite
sequence (τn)n∈N such that τ0 =
c⇒ ?
and, for all n ∈ N, τn
R
−−−→τn+1, hence, by Prop. 6
(1), we get τn ⊏ τn+1. By Prop. 7 (2), we have that τ =
⊔
τn is a well-formed infinite proof
tree, hence, by Lemma 17, we get the thesis.
We give now a lemma useful to prove the equivalence for wrong computations. We say that
a (finite) proof tree τ in R? is irreducible if there is no τ ′ such that τ
R
−−−→τ ′, and it is stuck if
it is irreducible and R?(r(τ)) = ?. Note that, by Prop. 5 (1) and Prop. 6 (1), a complete proof
tree τ is irreducible.
Lemma 18. If τ is a stuck proof tree with r(τ) = c⇒ ?, then Rwr ⊢ c⇒ wrong holds.
Proof. We proceed by induction on τ , analyzing cases on the last applied rule. There are three
cases:
axiom If an axiom is applied, then, since τ is stuck, there is no rule ρ ∈ R such that C (ρ) = c,
hence Rwr ⊢ c⇒ wrong holds, by applying the axiom.
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?-introduction If intro?(ρ, i, r) is applied, then, since τ is stuck, there is no rule ρ
′ ∼i ρ with
R(ρ′, i) = r , hence wrong(ρ, i, r) ∈ Rwr, and applying this rule we get Rwr ⊢ c⇒ wrong.
?-propagation If prop(ρ, i, ?) is applied, set ci = C (ρ, i), then, since τ is stuck, the subtree τ|i is
stuck as well and r(τ|i) = ci⇒ ?; hence, by induction hypothesis, we get Rwr ⊢ ci⇒ wrong
holds, thus, applying the rule prop(ρ, i,wrong), we get the thesis.
Theorem 12. Rwr ⊢ c⇒ wrong iff
c⇒ ?
R
−−−→⋆τ , where τ is stuck.
Proof. Rwr ⊢ c⇒ wrong implies
c⇒ ?
R
−−−→⋆τ where τ is stuck. We prove that there is a
stuck tree τ with r(τ) = c⇒ ?, then the thesis follows immediately from Prop. 6 (2). The proof
is by induction on rules. It is enough to consider only rules with wrong in the conclusion, hence
we have the following three cases:
axiom By definition, there is no rule ρ ∈ R such that C (ρ) = c, hence
c⇒ ?
is stuck.
wrong-introduction By definition of wrong(ρ, i, r), with ρ ≡ rule(j1 . . . jn, jn+1, c), there is
no rule ρ′ ∼i ρ such that R(ρ′, i) = r ; then, by Theorem 2 for each jk, with k ≤ i, there
is a finite proof tree τk, with r(τk) = jk, hence by applying the rule intro?(ρ, i, r) we get
a proof tree which is stuck, by definition of
R
−−−→.
wrong-propagation For a rule prop(ρ, i, ?) with ρ ≡ rule(j1 . . . jn, jn+1, c) and ci = C (ji), we
have, by induction hypothesis, that there is a stuck tree τ ′ such that r(τ ′) = ci⇒ ?; then,
by Theorem 2, for each k < i, there is a proof tree τk such that r(τk) = jk, hence, by
applying prop(ρ, i, ?) to τ1, . . . , τi−1, τ
′ we get a stuck tree.
c⇒ ?
R
−−−→⋆τ where τ is stuck implies Rwr ⊢ c⇒ wrong. It follows immediately from
Lemma 18, since r(τ) = c⇒ ? by hypothesis.
6.3 Soundness with respect to partial evaluation semantics
pev semantics enjoys both soundness-must and soundness-may properties, giving a way to
establish an explicit link between the previous two constructions. The statements are the
following:
soundness-must pev If c ∈ Π and
c⇒ ?
R
−−−→⋆τ , then either τ is complete or there is τ ′
such that τ
R
−−−→τ ′.
soundness-may pev If c ∈ Π, then either
c⇒ ?
R
−−−→⋆τ where τ is complete or
c⇒ ?
R
−−−→ω.
Hence, we could also prove the correctness of the proposed proof techniques using the pev
approach. Here we report the proof for soundness-must, as it is useful to show where, in the
evaluation process, the three conditions come into play.
Recall that R? is the extension of R with incomplete judgements c⇒ ?. In this approach,
the semantics is modelled by a reduction relation on finite proof trees in R?. We extend the
indexed predicate (Πι)ι∈I to finite proof trees τ and we will write τ |= Π if C (r(τ)) ∈ Π.
34
F. Dagnino et al.
Soundness-must with respect to the pev semantics follows, as usual, from progress and
subject reduction. Note that, for the reduction relation on proof trees, the latter is trivial since
the configuration at the root never changes in a reduction sequence. For the proof of progress
we need the following proposition.
Proposition 8. For any proof tree τ in R?, if τ |= Π, then, for all α ∈ dom(τ), C (τ(α)) ∈ Π.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of α, namely, on the level of the node α in the
tree τ . If |α| = 0, then α = ε, hence C (τ(α)) = C (r(τ)), hence the thesis holds by hypothesis,
since τ |= Π. Now, assume the thesis for α and prove it for αk for some k ∈ N>0. Since τ is a
proof tree, there is a rule ρ? with conclusion τ(α) and such that τ(αk) is its k-th premise. By
construction of rules in R?, for all h < k, we have R?(τ(αh)) ∈ R, hence, by Corollary 1, τ|αh
is complete, thus it is a finite proof tree in R, and so we get R ⊢ τ(αh). Then, by induction
hypothesis, we have C (τ(α)) ∈ Π, hence, by Prop. 2, we get C (τ(αk)) ∈ Π, as needed.
Lemma 19 (Progress for
R
−−−→). For each finite proof tree τ in R?, if τ |= Π, then either τ is
complete or there is τ ′ such that τ
R
−−−→τ ′.
Proof. The proof is by induction on τ . We split cases on the last applied rule.
• If τ = (ρ)
. . .
c⇒ u
, for ρ ∈ R, then u ∈ R, hence, by Corollary 1, τ is complete.
• If τ = (r?)
r⇒ ?
, then τ
R
−−−→
r⇒ r
.
• If τ = (c?)
c⇒ ?
with c /∈ R, then, since τ |= Π, we have c ∈ Π, hence, by condition S2,
there is ρ ≡ rule(j1 . . . jn, jn+1, c). Therefore, we get τ
R
−−−→
C (j1)⇒ ?
c⇒ ?
.
• If τ = (intro?(ρ, i, r))
τ1 . . . τi
c⇒ ?
, then r(τi) = C (ρ, i)⇒ r and so R?(r(τi)) = r . Hence, by
Corollary 1, τi is complete, thus we get R ⊢ C (ρ, i)⇒ r . Then, by condition S3, there is
ρ′ ∼i ρ such that R(ρ′, i) = r and there are two cases:
– if #(ρ′) = i, then τ
R
−−−→
τ1 . . . τi
c⇒ r
– if #(ρ′) > i, then τ
R
−−−→
τ1 . . . τi C (ρ
′, i+ 1)⇒ ?
c⇒ ?
.
• If τ = (prop(ρ,i,?))
τ1 . . . τi
c⇒ ?
, then r(τi) = c
′⇒ ? and, since τ |= Π, by Prop. 8, we get c′ ∈ Π,
that is, τi |= Π. Then, by induction hypothesis, either τi is complete, or τi
R
−−−→τ ′i for
some τ ′i ; but τi cannot be complete since r(τi) = c
′⇒ ?, hence τi
R
−−−→τ ′i , and this implies
τ
R
−−−→
τ1 . . . τi−1 τ
′
i
c⇒ ?
.
Theorem 13. If τ |= Π and τ
R
−−−→⋆τ ′, then either τ ′ is complete or there is τ ′′ such that
τ ′
R
−−−→τ ′′.
Proof. By induction on the number of steps in τ
R
−−−→⋆τ ′: if it is equal to 0, then τ = τ ′ and the
thesis follows by Lemma 19, otherwise, we have τ
R
−−−→τ1
R
−−−→⋆τ ′ and, since C (r(τ)) = C (r(τ1))
and τ |= Π, we have τ1 |= Π, hence we get the thesis by induction hypothesis.
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7 Related work
Modeling divergence The issue of modelling divergence in big-step semantics dates back
to [19], where a stratified approach with a separate coinductive judgment for divergence is
proposed, also investigated in [31].
In [5] the authors models divergence by interpreting coinductively standard big-step rules
and considering also non-well-founded values. In [17] a similar technique is exploited, by adding
a special result modelling divergence. Flag-based big-step semantics [37] captures divergence by
interpreting the same semantic rules both inductively and coinductively. In all these approaches,
spurious judgements can be derived for diverging computations.
Other proposals [33, 3] are inspired by the notion of definitional interpreter [38], where a
counter limits the number of steps of a computation. Thus, divergence can be modelled on
top of an inductive judgement: a program diverges if the timeout is raised for any value of
the counter, hence it is not directly modelled in the definition. Instead, [21] provides a way to
directly model divergence using definitional interpreters, relying on the coinductive partiality
monad [16].
The trace semantics in Sect. 3.1 has been inspired by [30]. Divergence propagation rules
are very similar to those used in [8, 9] to define a big-step judgment which directly includes
divergence as result. However, this direct definition relies on a non-standard notion of inference
system, allowing corules [7, 20], whereas for the trace semantics presented in this work stan-
dard coinduction is enough, since all rules are productive, that is, they always add an element
to the trace.
Differently from all the previously cited papers which consider specific examples, the work
[2] shares with us the aim of providing a generic construction to model non-termination, basing
on an arbitrary big-step semantics. Ager considers a class of big-step semantics identified by a
specific shape of rules, and defines, in a small-step style, a proof-search algorithm which follows
the big-step rules; in this way, converging, diverging and stuck computations are distinguished.
This approach is somehow similar to our pev semantics, even tough the transition system we
propose is directly defined on proof trees.
There is an extensive body of work on coalgebraic techniques, where the difference between
semantics can be simply expressed by a change of functor. In this paper we take a set-theoretic
approach, simple and accessible to a large audience. Furthermore, as far as we know [39],
coalgebras abstract several kinds of transition systems, thus being more similar to a small-step
approach. In our understanding, the coalgebra models a single computation step with possible
effects, and from this it is possible to derive a unique morphism into the final coalgebra modelling
the “whole” semantics. Our trace semantics, being big-step, seems to roughly correspond
to directly get this whole semantics. In other words, we do not have a coalgebra structure
on configurations.
Proving soundness As we have discussed, also proving (type) soundness with respect to
a big-step semantics is a challenging task, and some approaches have been proposed in the
literature. In [25], to show soundness of large steps semantics, they prove a coverage lemma,
which ensures that the rules cover all cases, including error situations. In [31] the authors prove
a soundness property similar to Theorem 4, but by using a separate judgment to represent
divergence, thus avoiding using traces. In [5] there is a proof of soundness of a coinductive
type system with respect to a coinductive big-step semantics for a Java-like language, defining
a relation between derivations in the type system and in the big-step semantics. In [8] there is
a proof principle, used to show type soundness with respect to a big-step semantics defined by
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an inference system with corules [7]. In [4] the proof of type soundness of a calculus formalising
path-dependent types relies on a big-step semantics, while in [3] soundness is shown for the
polymorphic type systems F<:, and for the DOT calculus, using definitional interpreters to
model the semantics. In both cases they extend the original semantics adding error and timeout,
and adopt inductive proof strategies, as in [40]. A similar approach is followed by [33] to show
type soundness of the Core ML language.
Also [6] proposes an inductive proof of type soundness for the big-step semantics of a
Java-like language, but relying on a notion of approximation of infinite derivation in the
big-step semantics.
Pretty big-step semantics [17] aims at providing an efficient representation of big-step se-
mantics, so that it can be easily extended without duplication of meta-rules. In order to define
and prove soundness, they propose a generic error rule based on a progress judgment, whose
definition can be easily derived manually from the set of evaluation rules. This is partly similar
to our wrong extension, with two main differences. First, by factorising rules, they introduce
intermediate steps as in small-step semantics, hence there are similar problems when intermedi-
ate steps are ill-typed (as in Sect. 5.2, Sect. 5.4). Second, wrong introduction is handled by the
progress judgment, that is, at the level of side-conditions. Moreover, in [13] there is a formali-
sation of the pretty-big-step rules for performing a generic reasoning on big-step semantics by
using abstract interpretation. However, the authors say that they interpret rules inductively,
hence non-terminating computations are not modelled.
Finally, some (but not all) infinite trees of our trace semantics can be seen as cyclic proof
trees, see end of Sect. 3.1. Proof systems supporting cyclic proofs can be found, e.g., in [14, 15]
for classical first order logic with inductive definitions.
8 Conclusion and future work
The most important contribution is a general approach for reasoning on soundness with respect
to a big-step operational semantics. Conditions can be proven by a case analysis on the se-
mantic (meta-)rules avoiding small-step-style intermediate configurations. This can be crucial
since there are calculi where the property to be checked is not preserved by such intermediate
configurations, whereas it holds for the final result, as illustrated in Sect. 5.
In future work, we plan to use the meta-theory in Sect. 2 as basis to investigate yet other
constructions, notably the approach relying on corules [8, 9], and that, adding a counter, based
on timeout [33, 3].
We also plan to compare our proof technique for proving soundness with the standard one
for small-step semantics: if a predicate satisfies progress and subject reduction with respect to a
small-step semantics, does it satisfy our soundness conditions with respect to an equivalent big-
step semantics? To formally prove such a statement, the first step will be to express equivalence
between small-step and big-step semantics. On the other hand, the converse does not hold, as
shown by the examples in Sect. 5.2 and Sect. 5.4.
For what concerns significant applications, we plan to use the approach to prove soundness
for the λ-calculus with full reduction and intersection/union types [10]. The interest of this
example lies in the failure of the subject reduction, as discussed in Sect. 5.4. In another direction,
we want to enhance MiniFJ&O with λ-abstractions and allowing everywhere intersection and
union types [24]. This will extend typability of shared expressions. We plan to apply our
approach to the big-step semantics of the statically typed virtual classes calculus developed in
[25], discussing also the non terminating computations not considered there.
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With regard to proofs, we plan to investigate if we can simplify them by means of enhanced
conductive techniques.
As a proof-of-concept, we provided a mechanisation6 in Agda of Lemma 1. The mecha-
nisations of the other proofs is similar. However, as future work, we think it would be more
interesting to provide a software for writing big-step definitions and for checking that the sound-
ness conditions hold.
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